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REINSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE:
GOVERNMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT
POOLS AS A CASE STUDY IN THE GOVERNANCE
ROLE PLAYED BY REINSURANCE INSTITUTIONS
MARCOS ANTONIO MENDOZA1
***
Scholars have eloquently detailed the “Insurance as Governance”
concept, the potential capacity for reinsurer regulatory influence on insurers, and
the many aspects under which these theories may arise. This Article takes the next
step in analyzing the complex reinsurer-insurer relationship through empirical
research into how carriers are actually influenced by reinsurers, and what effect
this has on the parties.
As a case study in the governance role played by reinsurance institutions,
this Article organizes survey interview responses of senior officials in the
governmental entity self-insured risk management pool sector into four distinct
discussion areas: (i) how reinsurers influence pools in general and in the key
areas of underwriting, claims, and finance/solvency; (ii) the duty of utmost good
faith and its effect; (iii) the level to which pools afford accommodation to
reinsurers; and (iv) whether reinsurer influence varies based on pool
circumstances, or external factors. While analysis of the data collected showed
varying degrees of regulation or governance by reinsurers, the Article concludes
that not only does a form of reinsurance influence or ‘governance’ clearly exist in
the largely unregulated world of self-insured pools, whether characterized as
direct, indirect, or regulatory in nature, but also that the governance effect is an
open and recognized influence that is accepted by the pools.

***
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This Article will discuss, as part of the ‘insurance as governance’2
debate, to what degree reinsurers can ‘govern’ or ‘regulate’ insurers.
Professor Aviva Abramovsky first addressed the impact of reinsurers on
insurers in Reinsurance: the Silent Regulator?,3 indicating that reinsurers
had a potential contractual influence on the insurance industry, therefore
reinsurers must be part of the regulatory discussion.4 While Professor
Abramovsky outlined the potential impact of reinsurers on insurers quite
well, it is important to hear from industry officials themselves to confirm
the existence of any contractual influence rising to the point of a
governance or regulatory role. 5 Since there are many complex issues in the
reinsurer-insurer relationship, this Article’s focus will be to answer how the
carriers are actually influenced by reinsurers, and what effect this has on
the parties.
Evidence gathered for this Article from senior officials in the
governmental entity risk management pooling industry, carriers that are
largely unregulated by insurance departments in most states, indicated
varying degrees of regulation or governance by their reinsurers. However,
this governance operates in the foreground, with the open acknowledgment
of both pool and reinsurer, much like a homeowner and their neighborhood
association. Overall, it is beneficial for both the reinsurer and the insurer.
This Article will examine:
 In Part II, Background—the history of self-funded pooling
and typical legal construction; an overview of reinsurance operative
concepts;6 the basic theories of insurance and reinsurance as governance;
and the overview of this original research;
2

‘Governance’ is defined as “controlling, directing, or regulating influence;
control, sway, mastery.” THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE ENGLISH OXFORD
DICTIONARY 1181 (18th ed. 1979). ‘Regulating influence’ and ‘sway’ will be the
focus of this Article.
3
Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J.
345 (2009).
4
Id. at 405.
5
The second part of Prof. Abramovsky’s premise, that reinsurers must be
discussed as part of the insurance regulatory process because of their regulatorytype influence, is outside the scope of this Article.
6
Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 350–75, has a more detailed overview of the
reinsurance process.
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 In Part III, Research Survey Methodology—a brief review of
how the survey was conducted and the participants chosen;
 In Part IV, Survey Results—the distinct influences of
reinsurance on pools, the effect of utmost good faith, the accommodation of
pools, and factors affecting reinsurer influence; and
 In Part V, Conclusion—how reinsurers create the governance
effect.
II.

BACKGROUND

To frame the discussion accurately, Part II first outlines the history
of governmental entity pools, including the Texas model as an example.
Second, it provides an overview of reinsurance concepts. Finally, Part II
discusses the basic theories of insurance and reinsurance as governance.
A.

BRIEF HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY POOLS AND THE
TEXAS MODEL

Governmental entity pools, which are self-funded cooperatives,
operate as ‘insurance’ carriers for most governmental entities today, and
are largely not subject to states’ regulation.7 Although they are not
considered insurance, these pools extend nearly identical coverage through
similar underwriting and claim activities, as well as provide other risk
management services. Though pools are a small segment in the insuring
market in terms of capital, their history shows that pools have a growing
impact in that market.
The relatively short history of pooling in the United States gives a
perspective of how pooling became a viable risk management alternative
for governmental entities. Pooling has been defined as “. . . a risk
financing mechanism whereby a group of public entities contribute to a
shared fund that in turn pays claims for and provides service to the
participating entity.”8
7

Even in states where pools are generally unregulated by their insurance
department, like Texas, certain lines of coverage may be individually regulated by
statute; e.g., for political subdivision pools regarding workers’ compensation, TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 504.001 et. seq. (West 2006).
8
Harold Pumford, Address at the 2012 AGRiP Spring Conference (Mar. 5,
2012). A related PowerPoint presentation is available from AGRiP, available at
http://www.agrip.org.
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The Governmental Accounting Standards Board #10 describes it
as:
A cooperative group of governmental entities joining
together to finance an exposure, liability, or risk. Risk may
include property and liability, workers’ compensation, or
employee health care. A pool may be a stand-alone entity
or included as part of a larger governmental entity that acts
as the pool’s sponsor.9
In other words, when two or more independent public entities wish
to share risk, they may do so by forming a pool, rather than independently
going to the market to obtain coverage.
Pools are both risk-finance and risk-transfer mechanisms. The
member entities of the pools transfer their exposures (minus a deductible)
to the pool, sharing with other entities in the pool the transfer of related
risks.10 The services (underwriters, claim operations, loss prevention/risk
management, reinsurance purchasing) are provided by the pool, or by third
parties retained by the pool.11 Pools do not issue an insurance policy, but a
similarly functioning document called a ‘plan document’ or ‘coverage
agreement’ that is a contract for coverage between the member entity and
the pool. Under the agreement, the pool will indemnify the member based
on the terms and conditions of the coverage agreement in exchange for a
‘contribution,’ rather than a ‘premium.’12 These coverage agreements
operate essentially like insurance policies, with coverage terms, exclusions,
exceptions to exclusions, coverage territories, and coverage periods.13
These agreements typically have coverage for general liability, professional
liability, auto liability, property, and workers compensation, utilizing both
claims-made and occurrence-based agreements.14
9

Gov’tal Acct. Stds. Bd., Statement No. 10 of the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board, in GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SERIES 49 (Nov.
1989).
10
Jason E. Doucette, Note, Wading Into the Pool: Interlocal Cooperation in
Municipal Insurance and the State Regulation of Public Entity Risk Sharing
Pools—a Survey, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 533, 537 (2002) (hereinafter Doucette).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 537–38.
14
General liability, auto liability, property, and workers compensation
coverages are typically occurrence based, while professional liability is typically
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Pools have many advantages over insurers for their members.
They tend to protect their members from cyclic insurance rates,15 offer loss
prevention services, offer savings (as they are non-profit organizations and
do not lose funds through broker fees), and have focus and expertise in
governmental entities not often found in insurers.16 However, pools’ typical
disadvantage for their members is that they are generally unregulated.
Therefore, their only duties are those outlined in the coverage agreements
with their members, and they are not generally subject to prompt payment
acts, bad faith claims, or penalties.17
Self-insured governmental pooling has its roots in the United States
in 1974 after the Texas legislature allowed entities to form pools to selfinsure.18 During this period, public entity officials in all states had concerns
claims-made based. Occurrence based relies on the date of the occurrence for
determining coverage, while claims-made depends on the date the claim is made
and reported to the carrier.
15
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–39 (1987), has an excellent discussion of market cycles and
their causes.
16
Yuhua Qiao, The New Generation of Public Risk Pools: What Is New?, 1–2
(on file with author).
17
It is the author’s experience that this tends to be mitigated because pools
have limited markets and therefore inherently attempt to service members
promptly to maintain their member base. Most operational charters limit the
potential membership, so even though a pool has a potential market of 1000 or
more members, it is still quite a finite number compared to markets for insurers.
Even if entities sign an interlocal agreement it usually does not obligate them to be
in the pool—it just gives them the option to be in the pool if they pay their annual
contribution, so high levels of service are inherently necessary to keep members.
See, e.g., App. D. The member potentially may go in and out of the pool in various
lines of coverage. Infra App. D, ¶¶ 2, 3, and 4. However, most pools are organized
so the governing boards are comprised of members’ representatives. Doucette,
supra note 10, at 538. This board representation gives pool members direct input as
to policy.
18
The author has found no evidence of a pool’s formation prior to January 4,
1974, when the Texas Association of School Boards, Inc., legally formed the
TASB Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurance Fund, although several pools claim
senior status. The formation documents are on file with TASB, Inc. The TASB
WCSIF merged into the TASB Risk Management Fund in 1997. History and
Mission, TASB RISK MGMT. FUND, https://www.tasbrmf.org/About/History-andMission.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). While California may claim precursor
legislation since 1949 regarding the ability of municipalities to act jointly, risk
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that the insurance industry was charging excessive premiums when
compared to the exposures,19 and that coverage and services developed for
the private sector did not adequately address public needs.20 The core
reason for the actions taken by the insurance industry was the view that,
due to the loss of many governmental immunities throughout this time
period, insurers had to increase premiums for governmental entities and
limit coverage for ordinary governmental activities, such as providing
parks and swimming pools. This led to a choice for governments: pay the
higher premiums for insurance, potentially limiting services and raising
taxes, or forgo insurance to self-insure, risking bankruptcy from large
judgments.21 Self-insuring was especially difficult for smaller local
governments, since the government’s local tax base was the source of
income. Lacking a sufficiently broad tax base, a small government was in
the difficult position of being unable to afford coverage, as well as lacking
the ability to pay any large judgments, should it go uninsured.22
Pools began their operations by capitalization through member
deposits or bond issues; some were not capitalized at all.23 Coverage was
the initial and primary concern for the governmental entities, but these
pools also developed loss prevention programs for their members. Public
agencies traditionally viewed insurance buying as little more than fulfilling
a requirement of a government code, and it was rare for a carrier to offer
loss prevention services for a public risk.24
Risk pool professionals formed industry associations to assist in the
development of this new industry. The Public Risk Management
Association’s (PRIMA)25 section on pooling formed in 1978, and

pooling itself was not authorized in California until 1975. Doucette, supra note 10,
at 547. Texas prevails, as usual.
19
See generally James R. Hackney, Jr., Note, A Proposal for Funding
Municipal Tort Liability, 98 YALE L.J. 389 (1988).
20
See generally Karen Nixon, Public Entity Pooling—Built to Last (2011),
http://www.cajpa.org/documents/Public-Entity-Pooling-Built-to-Last.pdf.
21
See Hackney, supra note 19, at 389.
22
Doucette, supra note 10, at 534–35 (citing Louis P. Vitullo & Scott J.
Peters, Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Municipal Insurance Crisis, 30
DEPAUL L. REV. 325, 334) (1981)).
23
Nixon, supra note 20, at 1.
24
Id. at 2.
25
The Association’s mission is to promote effective risk management in the
public interest as an essential component of public administration. See Strategic
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eventually spun off to become the Association of Governmental Risk Pools
(AGRiP) in 1998.26 State insurance regulators, however, were slow to react,
and most chose not to assert any regulatory authority over what was largely
viewed as self-insurance. While the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners27 eventually began an effort in 1991 to determine if model
regulations were needed for pools, this effort was eventually abandoned.28
While the complete history of pooling—its rise during the 1980s
and 1990s, and the insurance industry’s coincident struggles during the
same period—is outside the scope of this Article,29 pools continued to grow
and take market share because insurers were unwilling or unable to fill the
needs of increasingly exposed governmental entities. During this period of
tort excesses, subsequent tort reform and market instability, insurers lost a
great deal of the commercial market insureds, including governmental
entities, to alternative forms of risk transfer.30 Policyholders formed captive
Plan, PUBLIC RISK MGMT. ASS’N, http://www.primacentral.org/content.cfm?
sectionid=9 (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
26
Nixon, supra note 20, at 2. AGRiP is a national organization and
independent trade organization representing public entity pools. AGRiP’s vision
statement and organizational mission is: “As the recognized authority on and
resource for information on intergovernmental pools, AGRiP is the leading
national association for pool management. As a result of our efforts, the pooling
community is united to achieve excellence in pool governance, management and
services.” What Is AGRiP?, ASS’N OF GOV’TAL RISK POOLS,
http://www.agrip.org/whatisagrip (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
27
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners is the U.S. standardsetting and regulatory support organization created and governed by the chief
insurance regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S.
territories. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/ (last
visited Dec. 27, 2014). While the NAIC sets standards for states to follow
voluntarily, it has no inherent regulatory authority. However, it does have a great
deal of influence in the insurance industry.
28
Doucette, supra note 10, at 543 (citing the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs,
1992 Summer National Meeting, Executive Committee 10, *70–71, Lexis 1992-2
NAIC Proc. 10).
29
But see Doucette, supra note 10, at 543; see also Priest, supra note 15; see
generally Nancy Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, 72-JUL A.B.A. J.
48 (1986); Kenneth Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability
Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85 (2001). These papers give a fascinating look at the
various causes of the insurance crisis, and show how legislatures, regulators, and
the judiciary played respective roles during this time.
30
Abraham, supra note 29, at 99–102.
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insurers, risk retention groups and pools to provide themselves coverage.31
These vehicles allowed them to deal directly with the reinsurance market
through the closely controlled pools, allowing governmental entities risk
diversification services without the need (or cost) of conventional
commercial general liability policies as an intermediary.32 The
governmental entity business lost by the commercial market during these
years never returned, as the entities learned during this insurance crisis they
did not need to rely on the insurance market.33 Furthermore, because of the
skyrocketing premiums,34 governmental entities came to distrust insurers;
as a result, the alternative market of pooling increased its percentage of the
market in the ensuing years.35
There are approximately 91,000 distinct governmental entities
currently operating in the United States, including counties, cities, school
districts, townships and special districts.36 Approximately 500 pools are
now in existence providing coverage, in some form, for approximately
75,000 of those 91,000 governmental entities.37 Pools have differing
administrative operations—39% of pools have their own employees, 35%
are staffed by third party administrators of varying sizes and 26% are
administered by association employees.38 Pool staffs are small compared
with those of insurers: of pools with their own employees, 37% have a staff
of five or less, 26% have more than 20 employees, 21% have 11-20
employees, and 16% have 6-10 employees.39 Annual contributions
(premiums) by members to their U.S. pools are estimated to be 13 to 17
billion dollars.40 The pooling industry, while small compared to the main
line insurers, is a substantial sector of the insurance market.41

31

Id. at 101–02 (citing Priest, supra note 15).
Id. at 102.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 99.
35
Id. at 102.
36
Pumford, supra note 8 (citing 2007 U.S. Census statistics stating that the
special districts include health and hospital districts, airport authorities, port
authorities, and utility districts).
37
Id.
38
Nixon, supra note 20, at 3 (using 2009 AGRiP data).
39
Id.
40
Pumford, supra note 8.
41
For a more negative view of pooling versus insurance companies or pools,
such as the Missouri Public Entity Risk Management Fund, which operate more
32

2014

REINSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE

61

Since laws vary throughout the United States and a survey of the
states’ pooling laws is beyond the scope and focus of this Article, Texas
statute and case law will be used to assist in the initial understanding of the
legal organization and operation of pools. Most states are similar to Texas
in that they have little or no regulation of pools since they are not
considered insurance carriers by statute or case law.42 For the purposes of
this discussion, their organization is not as relevant as is the cause and
effect of reinsurance. But, for those unfamiliar with pooling, here are the
basic legal constructs.
Local governments43 that join in a common purpose44 under the
Texas Interlocal Cooperation Act45 may self-insure against claims.46 In
like insurers, see generally Thomas W. Rynard, The Local Government as Insured
or Insurer: Some New Risk Management Alternatives, 20 URB. L. REV. 103 (1988).
42
E.g., City of S. El Monte v. So. Cal. Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 45 Cal. Rptr.
2d 729, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). CAL. GOV’T CODE § 990.8(c) (West 2010) states
“[t]he pooling of self-insured claims or losses among entities as authorized in
subdivision (a) of Section 990.4 shall not be considered insurance nor be subject to
regulation under the Insurance Code.” See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2744.081(E)(2) (West 2006) (“A joint self-insurance pool is not an insurance
company. Its operation does not constitute doing an insurance business and is not
subject to the insurance laws of this state”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10115.5(2) (West 2008) (“Any self-insurance pool authorized by subsection (1) of
this section shall not be construed to be an insurance company nor otherwise
subject to the provisions of the laws of this state regulating insurance or insurance
companies . . . ”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 731.036(4), (5) (West 2003) (“[T]he
Insurance Code does not apply to any of the following to the extent of subject
matter of the exemption . . . (4) Public bodies . . . that either individually or jointly
establish a self-insurance fund for tort liability . . . [or] (5) Public bodies . . . that
either individually or jointly establish a self-insurance fund for property damage . .
. ”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.4622 (West Supp. 2007) (which does not subject pools
to the Florida Insurance Code, other than some reporting and initial capitalization
requirements).
43
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 791.003(4) (West 2012) (defining “local
government”).
44
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 791.001 (West 2012) (“The purpose of this
chapter is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of local governments by
authorizing them to contract, to the greatest possible extent, with one another and
with agencies of the state.”).
45
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 791.001–.033 (West 2012).
46
Tex. Ass’n of Sch. Bds. Risk Mgmt. Fund v. Benavides Indep. Sch. Dist.,
221 S.W.3d 732, 733 (Tex. App. 2007).
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accordance with the Interlocal Cooperation Act, Texas law permits any
governmental unit47 to establish a self-insurance fund to protect the
governmental unit, its officers, employees, and agents from any insurable
risk or hazard.48 The issuance of available money for a self-insurance fund
is deemed a public purpose of the governmental unit and such funds are not
subject to the Texas Insurance Code and other laws of Texas relating to the
provision or regulation of insurance.49
Self-insurance funds themselves are not subject to the Texas
Insurance Code pursuant to Texas case law. In Hill v. Texas Council Risk
Management Fund,50 the Court of Appeals held that self-insurance funds
established by governmental units51 are exempt from the Texas Insurance
Code.52 The plaintiff in this case brought suit against her employer’s selfinsurance fund, the Texas Council Risk Management Fund, alleging that
uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist insurance should be
presumed to exist in her policy because it was not rejected by her in writing
as required by the Texas Insurance Code.53 The Texas Council Risk
Management Fund argued that pursuant to Texas Civil Statute Article
715c,54 because the self-insurance fund was created by money available to
the governmental unit, the fund was not subject to the Texas Insurance
Code or any other laws relating to the provision and regulation of
insurance.55 The court agreed.
The Texas Supreme Court solidified the position of pools in Ben
Bolt-Palito Blanco Consolidated Independent School District v. Texas
Political Subdivisions Property/Casualty Joint Self-Insurance Fund,56 in
which the Texas Supreme Court decided the self-insurance fund was its
own distinct governmental entity, which entitled the pool to assert
47

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2259.001(1) (West 2008) (defining a
“governmental unit” as a “state agency or institution, local government, or an
entity acting on behalf of a state agency or institution or local government.”).
48
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2259.031(a) (West 2008).
49
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2259.032, .037 (West 2008).
50
20 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App. 2000).
51
The provision cited by the Hill court has since been repealed but is
incorporated in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. ch. 2259 (West 2008).
52
Hill, 20 S.W.3d at 213.
53
Cited in Hill as TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-1. The statute has since been
repealed, but is incorporated in TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1952.101 (West 2009).
54
Supra note 51.
55
Hill, 20 S.W.3d at 212–13.
56
212 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. 2006).
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immunity in its own right and enjoy the same immunities as the political
subdivisions that comprised the pool.57 However, even pools waive this
immunity when entering into written contractual agreements, such as
contracts for coverage with their own members.58
Essentially, the legal process works as follows: two or more
governmental entities decide to share risk, sign an interlocal agreement
stating so, form the pool, fund the pool, and hire personnel to handle the
administration of the pool.
B.

OVERVIEW OF REINSURANCE CONCEPTS

Generally, reinsurance operates identically with pools as it does
with insurers. Pools, like insurance carriers, obtain reinsurance for those
exposures that are too great to retain. Reinsurance may be defined as a
contractual arrangement under which one insurer, known as the primary
insurer, transfers to another insurer, known as the reinsurer, some or all of
the losses insured by the primary insurer under insurance contracts it has
issued or will issue in the future.59 The primary insurer is sometimes
referred to as the ceding insurer, ceding entity, cedent, or reinsured. For
consistency, the term cedent (or pool) and reinsurer will be used when
referring to reinsurance situations.
In most cases, the reinsurer does not assume all of the liability of
the cedent pool. The reinsurance agreement usually requires the cedent to
keep a portion of the liability. This is known as the cedent’s retention, and
may be expressed as a dollar amount, a percentage of the original amount
of insurance, or a combination of the two. There is usually an upper limit
to the reinsurer’s limit of liability.60
The primary functions of reinsurance are: stabilization of the
cedent’s long-term loss experience; giving the cedent large line capacity;
cedent financing; cedent catastrophe protection; underwriting assistance;
and, allowing the cedent to retire from a territory or class of business.61
Discussing the primary functions of reinsurance in order:

57

Id. at 325–26.
See id.; see also TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.152 (West 2005).
59
2 BERNARD L. WEBB ET AL., INSURANCE OPERATIONS 1 (2d ed. 1997).
60
Id. at 1–2.
61
Id. at 2. Retirement from a territory or class of business is generally not
relevant to pooling and will not be discussed here.
58
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Stabilization of loss experience—A pool must have a consistent
positive underwriting experience in order to increase its capital and surplus
to support growth and stability of the pool. Because losses can fluctuate,
sometimes widely, a major function of reinsurance is to lessen the impact
of large losses through controlled spending of reinsurance premiums.62
Large line capacity—There are two kinds of capacity in the
property and casualty world—large line capacity and premium capacity.
Large line refers to a cedent’s ability to provide a high limit of insurance on
a single loss exposure. A cedent may write a large line by keeping its
retention within a reasonable relationship to its capital and surplus and
reinsuring the balance. A competitive market environment creates the need
for reinsurance;63 without reinsurance, a carrier could not market to larger
exposures, ceding the available market to larger carriers.
Financing—The second kind of capacity is premium capacity,
which refers to the aggregate premium volume a pool can write. The
common measure of capacity is expressed in terms of contribution-tosurplus ratio. This is because there is a limit to the amount of contributions
a pool can write. The limit for any pool is a function of the carrier’s
surplus.64 A pool is likely to be considered overextended if its net written
contributions, after deduction of contributions on reinsurance ceded,
exceeds its surplus by a ratio of more than three to one.65
Catastrophe Protection—Property and casualty insurers (and to a
lesser extent, workers’ compensation insurers), are subject to catastrophic
losses that may result in millions of dollars of claims to a single pool. The
purpose of reinsurance is generally related to the purpose of stabilizing loss
experience, as catastrophes are major causes of the instability.66
Underwriting Assistance—Reinsurers deal with a wide variety and
a large number of carriers. As a result, they accumulate a great deal of
information regarding the experience of various cedents in certain markets.

62

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 4.
64
Surplus is defined as the amount by which assets exceed liabilities. Int’l
Risk Mgmt. Inst., Inc., Surplus, IRMI RISK MGMT. & INS. EDUC. & INFO.,
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/s/surplus.aspx. (last visited
Dec. 27, 2014).
65
WEBB ET AL., supra note 59, at 4.
66
Id. at 7.
63
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This experience can be helpful to pools, particularly to smaller pools or
carriers planning on entering new and unfamiliar markets.67
As can be seen above, reinsurers have far-ranging functions and
benefits in the marketplace.
As to the types of reinsurance, there are two basic forms: treaty
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance.68 Facultative reinsurance is
purchased for a specific risk insured by a cedent, such as a particular piece
of machinery.69 Treaty reinsurance, the most commonly used reinsurance in
pooling, is an agreement that binds the cedent to cede a specific portion of
the risk of an entire class of business, such as all property coverage written
by the cedents, to a reinsurer. Through one contract, the treaty reinsurer is
required to cover a cedent on an entire book of business, even on business
yet unwritten by the cedent.70
There are two main duties in the reinsurance relationship with
cedents that are relevant to our discussion. The first is a common law duty
of “utmost good faith”71 between the parties.72 This is defined as the “most
abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty;
the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight.”73 This
common law duty of utmost good faith was viewed as necessary for the
very foundation of reinsurance:
Historically, the reinsurance market has
relied on a practice of the exercise of
utmost good faith to decrease monitoring
costs and ex ante contracting costs.
Reinsurance works only if the sums of the
reinsurance premiums are less than the
original insurance premium. Otherwise,
the ceding insurers will not reinsure. For
the reinsurance premium to be less,
67

Id. at 7–8.
There are many sub-types of reinsurance: facultative obligatory and
automatic facultative, among others. Id. at 10–11.
69
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE 2-5 to 2-7 (2d ed. 2000).
70
Id. at 2-4 to 2-5; see also WEBB ET AL., supra note 59, at 10.
71
In Latin, uberrima fides.
72
OSTRAGER &VYSKOCIL, supra note 69, at 3-4 to 3-6.
73
Id. at 3-4 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990)).
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reinsurers cannot duplicate the costly but
necessary efforts of the primary insurer in
evaluating risks and handling claims . . .
[t]hey are protected, however, by a large
area of common interest with ceding
insurers and by the tradition of utmost
good faith, particularly in the sharing of
information.74
Because of the nature of reinsurance, the cedent’s duty to the
reinsurer to disclose information is very broad. The duty of utmost good
faith also extends to all of a cedent’s business activities, including
underwriting and claims handling.75 However, case law makes it very clear
this duty of utmost good faith is a reciprocal one, owed by both cedents and
their reinsurers.76 Reinsurers must appropriately investigate and pay
cedent’s claims.
The second main duty in this reinsurance relationship is the
“follow the fortunes” doctrine. Similar in concept to utmost good faith,
this doctrine requires the reinsurer to follow the cedent’s underwriting
fortunes. In other words, if the pool suffers an underwriting loss due to a
large claim, the reinsurer has the duty to suffer a loss by the agreement
terms as well, restricting the reinsurer from questioning the validity of
cedents’ good faith claim payments. Under this doctrine, reinsurers must
indemnify cedents for reasonable settlements and judgments.77 The
reinsurer is required to indemnify the cedent for reasonable payments made
within the terms of the original agreement with their insured (or member,

74

Id. at 3-5 (citing Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049,
1054 (2d Cir. 1993)).
75
Id. at 3-19 (citing Am. Marine Ins. Grp. v. Neptunia Ins. Co., 775 F. Supp.
703, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing that a
ceding insurer satisfies its duty when it acts “honestly and . . . [with] all proper and
businesslike steps”)).
76
Id. at 3-6 (citing Compagnie de Reassurance d’Ile de France v. New Eng.
Reinsurance Corp., 57 F.3d 56, 88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995);
United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 53 F. Supp. 2d 632, 642
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The duty of utmost good faith is a mutual one; it is an
obligation of the reinsurer as well as the cedent.”)).
77
Id. at 9-3 (citing Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cologne Reinsurance
Co., 552 N.E. 2d 139, 140 (1990)).
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for pools), even if the claim is technically not covered by it.78 One purpose
of the follow the fortunes doctrine is to allow reinsurers to avoid the
unnecessary expense, delay and risk that would result from duplicative
claims handling, and instead rely on the cedent’s honesty and competence
in adjusting claims.79 The doctrine also promotes settlements since, without
the doctrine, cedents would have to litigate every coverage dispute with its
insured or member, or obtain consent from reinsurers to settle on every file.
Additionally, reinsurers seeking to deny coverage would then use defenses
that the cedents might raise against their insureds or members in coverage
disputes. The same coverage dispute would be re-litigated repeatedly
upward along the risk transfer chain.80
The doctrines of utmost good faith and follow the fortunes are
distinguished from other reinsurance topics because, since the mid-1990’s,
these doctrines appear to be the aspects of the reinsurance framework that
received the most scrutiny. As profit margins of the era diminished, and
catastrophic claims grew, the acceptance of the historical ‘gentleman’s
agreement’ regarding reinsurance seemed to be in peril.81 The push by both
cedent and reinsurer was towards arms-length and sophisticated
transactions, instead of relying on treaty certificates of only a few pages,

78

Id. at 9-5 (citing Christiana Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 979 F. 2d
268, 280 (2d Cir. 1992)).
79
Id. at 9-11 (citing Ins. Co. of the State of PA v. Grand Union Ins. Co.,
[1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 208, 210 (C.A.)).
80
Id. at 9-12 (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F. 3d
1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1995)). Reinsurers sometimes have their own reinsurers,
known as retrocessionaires. Retrocessionaire, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., RISK &
INSURANCE, http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/r/retrocession
aire.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). Such retrocessionaires would add to the
coverage litigation complexity were it not for the ‘follow the fortunes’ doctrine.
81
See generally Steven W. Thomas, Utmost Good Faith in Reinsurance: A
Tradition in Need of Adjustment, 41 DUKE L.J. 1548 (1992). Thomas emphasized
environmental claims, which are not usually involved with governmental entities,
but also felt large catastrophic claims were a culprit in this distancing of the
cedent-reinsurer relationship. It is the author’s experience that governmental pools
have large exposures as well, usually in the form of property with weather related
exposures, such as hail or tornadoes.
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and a degree of faith. The trust factor was diminishing and courts were
playing a part in dismantling the doctrines,82 thus bringing us to the present.
C.

INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE

Analysis of the governance role of insurance starts with the basic
argument raised by Insurance as Governance,83 in which the authors
explored their theory that the insurance industry has a great societal impact,
largely invisible and freely accepted, that functions as a form of
government beyond the state. The authors examine, first, how the
insurance industry is one of the most pervasive and powerful institutions in
society, and, second, despite acting in the background, how insurance
governs our lives.
Insurance as Governance analyzes how society consumes
insurance products, becomes part of the product, and how insurers then
govern through the maintenance of risk pools of insureds that are large
enough to ensure losses are reasonably predictable, thus subject to
governance. It points to the economic, social, legal, cultural and political
dimensions of insurance as governance, and to the significance of insurance
for political sociology. The authors describe insurance as “moral
technology,” defining how people should act, and finds that insurance as
governance focuses on a form of private regulation of moral risks, all of
which are subject to classification and segmentation by insurers.
While a fascinating work regarding insurers as a governance force
in society, Insurance as Governance did not examine the insurer of
insurers, the reinsurers, and how reinsurers’ influence in the marketplace
might take the form of governance over insurers, and thus society. While
the authors described the reinsurer relationship as one of suspicion, and the
reinsurance process as being fraught with moral risk judgments and
implications,84 they did not address the relationship aspect further as to the
governance potential of reinsurance.
However, Professor Aviva Abramovsky’s article, Reinsurance: the
Silent Regulator?, opened the discussion as to the potential for reinsurer
82

OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 69, at 3-24 (citing Franklin D.
Marsteller, Uberrima Fides: Reinsurers Take Aim at Lack of Good Faith, 8 L. DIG.
24 (1988).
83
See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE
(2003).
84
Id. at 114–25, 365.
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governance. She posited that insurers themselves might be silently
regulated, apart from state regulation, by the influence of reinsurers whose
product is necessary to those insurers.
Her conclusion was that
reinsurance, through private contract, had the capacity to certainly
influence, if not directly regulate, insurer behavior. This influence,
Professor Abramovsky felt, took forms such as affecting insurer
underwriting and claim handling, as well as the potential for reinsurers to
support rather than prohibit unfair insurer practices through the moral
hazard of reinsuring tortious activity.85 Because of this ability, she opined,
reinsurance influence capacity should be a part of regulatory discussions of
the insurance industry as a whole.86 While Professor Abramovsky
demonstrated in detail the potential capacity for reinsurer regulatory
influence and many aspects under which it might arise, her research did not
delve into what was actually happening on the ground with carriers and
their staff. Were insurers actually influenced by the reinsurer relationship,
and if so, to what extent? What did their experience reflect? Field research
would be necessary for a fuller understanding of this reinsurer influence
concept.
Based on research conducted for this Article, a clear conclusion
can be reached that pools, while not regulated per se by reinsurers, are
substantively influenced in their operations by reinsurers’ specific requests,
whether pre- or post-engagement. These reinsurers’ requests, with consent
by the pools, create a form of governance voluntarily accepted by the
pools. Through varying parameters set forth by reinsurers, pools can
individually decide to what degree they wish to have their operations
governed. Because of the necessity of reinsurance for some pools, they
agree to more oversight; because of the financial strength of other pools,
they are able to insist on less governance, or none at all through complete
self-insurance. Some pools feel the influence greatly in both underwriting
and claims, some in one area or the other, and some only indirectly or
generally. Nevertheless, while reinsurance governance varies from pool to
pool, and is voluntarily accepted, this research shows that it exists.
This research also indicates, because of these close relationships,
that governmental risk pools are a corner of the market where the
reinsurance concept of “utmost good faith” still appears to thrive. At least
in pooling, utmost good faith is a vital part of the reinsurer-cedent process,

85
86

Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 385–401.
Id. at 405.
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and is only growing more necessary for the profitability of the reinsurers,
and the operating efficiency of many pools.
Additionally, pools are accommodating to reinsurer’s input,
although the accommodation levels vary; and several factors affect the
level of reinsurer influence, most notably the financial solvency of the pool.
Both of these results tie back into the utmost good faith and the voluntary
acceptance of the reinsurers’ form of governance mentioned above.
No doubt, some readers may disagree with this interpretation of the
evidence, and some survey participants may differ regarding the
characterization of their comments. This may arise from the general vision,
for good or ill, of ‘governance’ or ‘regulation’ as linked with state power,
often in a negative fashion.87 Additionally, while this research cannot be
directly extrapolated to main-line insurers or even give a complete and
comprehensive view of the pooling world, it constitutes a waypoint for
future research and discussion.
III.

RESEARCH SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Because of the author’s current professional position,88 the focus of
the research was on one small corner of the insurance and risk management
world, the governmental entity self-insured risk management pools, as a
case study. Limiting the discussion to this segment of the market allowed
an examination of a more pure reinsurer-cedent environment. Rather than
research with insurers that already felt the effects of state regulators, there
was an opportunity to interview carriers that had little or no state
regulation. While interviewing insurers would be broader research, it
87

Id. at 346 (“Yet such a restrictive vision of regulation is simplistic and
ignores the capacity of private institutions to regulate the activities of large swaths
of social actors.”).
88
The author is currently Assistant Director, Legal and Regulatory Affairs, for
the Texas Association of School Boards, Inc., the third party administrator for the
TASB Risk Management Fund, an administrative agency of cooperating local
governments. The Fund, based in Austin, Texas, is a self-insured governmental
entity risk management pool providing coverage for approximately 1100 school
districts, junior colleges, and related educational entities throughout Texas. The
Fund is the result of separate funds merging in 1997 to put all lines of coverage
under one entity. TASB, Inc., the administrator to the Fund, currently has 450
employees, of which 176 are solely assigned to the administration of the Fund.
The Fund has total assets of $333,764,377 and a members’ equity of $227,923,874
(as of August 31, 2013). Documents on file with TASB, Inc.
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would be more difficult to disentangle the state regulator influence from the
initial discussion.
For this research, four pooling industry sources provided
suggestions for potential survey participants. These sources eventually
became interviewees themselves.89 The author knew three of the
interviewees professionally prior to the survey. Because of the necessity
for introductions to the rest of the survey group, the survey was not
conducted in a purely random manner.90 While this ‘referral’ method
increased the response rate to nearly 100%, the survey lacked a randomness
factor and perhaps the size needed for a more scientific survey. However,
this referral survey method may have led to greater candor and willingness
for detailed responses, even more so for one interviewee whom had
recently retired.91
Thirteen senior officials with pools from across the country
responded to the survey. Their responses were unique to their own pool or
experiences; some pools only have one or two lines of coverage, some join
with other pools for certain lines of coverage, and some offer all lines of
coverage for their members. The pools are distributed geographically
across the United States: two pools located in the Midwest, three in the
South, three in the East, and five in the West. Additionally, two senior
officials, one current and one former, with the Association of
Governmental Risk Pools (AGRiP), also responded, as well as a reinsurer
underwriter. The two AGRiP officials, having interacted with leaders of
over 200 member pools across the country, were probably in the best
position to see broad trends, as was the reinsurer underwriter.92 However,
the pooling officials were in the best current position for opining on direct
reinsurer effects.

89

This is both fortunate, because of their immense experience, and
unfortunate, as they cannot be publicly thanked due to the ethical format rules of
publishing survey research. However, they know who they are. The author wishes
to thank them all for their guidance through the world of pooling.
90
Had the survey been completely random, rather than by referral, the
response rate would have likely been greatly reduced. Only one person did not
respond. Industry officials, on the author’s behalf, contacted several other potential
participants, with no response. This number is unknown, but estimated to be less
than ten.
91
Additionally, one other participant was an active official during the survey
and retired prior to the completion of this paper.
92
No other reinsurer representative was willing to participate.
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The survey interview was in a written format via email; although
one was a telephone interview with follow up confirming emails as to
content.93 The interview was semi-structured in nature, in that interviews
began with the same general questions to all pooling official participants,
but follow-up questions were individualized based on the types and forms
of responses.94 The survey questions were altered for the AGRiP officials
and the reinsurer underwriter because of their more industry-wide view.95
Three appendices of the initial research survey questions are attached. The
responses were free form, which resulted in additional contact with most of
the survey participants for the purpose of follow-up questions or
clarifications. Because of this, the survey results acquired a “snowball”
effect, gathering information down the winter path, injecting some degree
of randomness along the way. Many interviewees took their own course as
to the responses, and did not stay with the original question format. The
responses tended to be conversational in nature; while making it more
difficult to place in context for this Article, the result was beneficial to this
research.
IV.

SURVEY RESULTS

Having explored the history and legal constructs of pooling,
reviewed the purpose of reinsurance, examined the concept of insurance
93

The telephone interview was simply a preference by the participant; he later
approved his quotes via email. The initial questions were identical.
94
In retrospect, with the conclusion in hand, there may have been more
effective initial and follow up questions (e.g., infra note 164). Hindsight is a
wonderful teacher.
95
All of the individuals responding gave the author permission to quote them
verbatim, although some minor corrections for any typographical errors and for
clarity in the context of this Article were made. The author sincerely thanks all of
the respondents for making this Article possible through their extremely generous
contributions of time, as well as their patience, with the author’s inquiries. Their
assistance was invaluable. The original e-mails are on file with the author. Because
some respondents had no opinion on a particular matter, or lacked experience in a
particular area, not every respondent answered every question. The survey
participants also demonstrated a willingness of several of the participants to share
specific underwriting information, which may seem unusual in this proprietary age.
However, this is because the pools themselves are public entities using public
funds, and as such, their records are open; e.g., the Texas Public Information Act,
TEX. GOV. CODE ANN. §§ 552.001 et seq. (West 2012).
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and reinsurance as governance, and outlined the survey mechanics, we
arrive at the focus of this paper: to what extent does reinsurance have a
governance effect on insurers?
Four distinct discussion areas arose in the survey interviews:96





How reinsurers influence pools—underwriting, claims,
finance/solvency, and generally;
The duty of utmost good faith and its effect;
To what level pools afford accommodation to
reinsurers; and
Whether reinsurer influence varies based on pool
circumstances, or external factors.

Because of the overlapping nature of some of the answers, many of
the responses could apply to several subject matter units and it was often
difficult to extricate the comments into singular areas. Therefore, some
comments, based on the correlative relationship subject matter, may easily
apply to several topics. At some point, interviewees’ opinions had to find a
home, although some may disagree as to their placement. So, we begin.
A.

HOW REINSURERS INFLUENCE POOLS

The initial question to the pooling senior officials was
straightforward—do you think pools are influenced by reinsurers, and if so,
how? The term ‘regulated’ was not mentioned to the pooling senior
officials due to the concern that the term would be interpreted too
restrictively and compared directly to state regulation, which pooling
officials tend to view as their kryptonite.97 For initial inquiries directed to
96

The four areas materialized through the form of the question, or in the
manner in which the interviewees responded.
97
It has been the author’s experience that this general attitude has little to do
with specific concerns about regulatory oversight, or apprehension regarding
irradiated fragments from exploded planets. It has to do more with the greater
ability to be competitive in the marketplace and serve their members more
efficiently and with flexibility. As discussed in the pooling background section,
pools are extremely transparent in their operations due to their public nature, much
more so than private insurers. Because their executive boards are filled with
representatives of their own members, it is felt they will ‘do the right thing’ on
their members’ behalf without burdensome, and expensive, regulatory oversight.
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the AGRiP officials and the reinsurance underwriter, the term ‘regulated’
was used, since it was felt they could more easily discern the true intent of
the question based on their broader experiences. The overall responses
generally reflected that yes, pools are influenced by reinsurers, as
suspected. But, how are they influenced, and to what extent? The
influence appears to be to the point of reinsurer governance, although
freely accepted by the carriers. However, this is only part of the story. The
initial responses are broken down into four key areas of influence:
Underwriting, Claims, Finance/Solvency, and General/Miscellaneous.
1. Underwriting
The survey participants emphasized underwriting as a main area
where reinsurers had the most influence and this is where the most specific
examples arose. In other areas, examples tended to be less definitive and
more conjectural. This is likely because, by its nature, underwriting is
more of a science, unlike claim operations, which tend more towards an art
form.
A senior official with the Missouri Housing Authorities Property
and Casualty, Inc.,98 discussed underwriting influence due to the necessity
of reinsurance and pricing as being key factors. She indicated:
The impact upon the pricing and availability of reinsurance
. . . is on my mind, influencing each and every decision
that I make . . . [s]ince approximately [one-third] of
members’ annual contributions pay for ceded coverage at
our pool, it is vitally important to keep the cost down, to
the extent that we can. While I am fairly new to pooling, I
learned the impact that a major loss can have on
As a senior official with the Texas Association of School Boards, Inc., stated when
asked about this issue: “Most pools are outgrowths of their membership and
therefore have always thought of themselves as governmental in nature, rather than
insurance-like. I think the notion that a governmental self-insurance entity would
be subject to insurance regulation just didn’t make sense . . . Pools do NOT
consider themselves insurance companies, so to be regulated like one would be
really anathema to them.” E-mail from senior official, Texas Ass’n of Sch. Bds.,
Inc. to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (the author) (Mar. 23, 2013, 8:26 PM CST) (on
file with author).
98
The Missouri Housing Authorities Property & Casualty, Inc., website is
available at http://www.mhapci.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
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reinsurance premium early in my career [as a senior
official]. In May, 2011, one of our [m]embers suffered a
catastrophic loss of life and property.99 The total incurred
loss [for our pool] exceeded $8,000,000.
When we went out into the reinsurance market for the
ensuing policy year, the reinsurance cost increased by
43%, due in part to a 32% increase in the total insured
value of our properties, which also resulted from a
reinsurance-influenced decision. Following this loss and a
couple of other big losses that followed closely on its
heels, we learned that on the whole, our members’
replacement cost property estimates and property insurance
limits were low and that in many cases member properties
were inadequately covered. Not only did we notice this,
but the issue must also have come to the attention of our
reinsurers who, for perhaps the first time in our history,
established a margin clause100 of 100%. In other words, in
the event of a loss, the reinsurer would not pay any more
than the estimated replacement cost. Following the 2012
reinsurance placement cycle, I went to the Board with a
recommendation that the Board hire an insurance valuation
company to measure unique buildings and secure a
replacement cost valuation for each and every building that
the pool covers. This decision resulted in our ability to
negotiate a 130% margin clause for 2013 coverage, as the
reinsurers were more confident that they were collecting
the right amount of premium.

99

See Joplin Tornado Event Summary, NAT’L WEATHER SERVICE,
http://www.crh.noaa.gov/sgf/?n=event_2011may22_summary (last visited Dec. 27,
2014).
100
A margin clause is defined as, “[a] nonstandard commercial property
insurance provision stating that the most the insured can collect for a loss at a
given location is a specified percentage of the values reported for that location on
the insured's statement of values.” Margin Clause, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., RISK
INS.,
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/m/marginAND
clause.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
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Another example of the reinsurer influence occurred
around 2005. My predecessor was informed that blanket
coverage would no longer be available and was provided a
timetable to convert to property scheduling by individual
building in order for continued availability of reinsurance
by long-standing reinsurance partners. The pool had to go
out to the membership and get a listing with square footage
and values for each and every building. This was a timeconsuming, expensive and controversial proposition that
was accomplished to ensure availability of reinsurance.
[However,] I have not received any reinsurer . . .
suggestions [as to] what coverages to offer or underwriting
criterion.101
This senior official’s experience shows the availability of
reinsurance was in danger without substantial action by the pool, which
shows a great deal of underwriting influence by a reinsurer. As this official
indicated, every decision is influenced by the pricing and availability of
reinsurance. Since the pool was willing to do what was necessary to show
utmost good faith and transparency in underwriting, the reinsurer also felt
confidence in the pool’s leadership and agreed to favorable terms moving
forward. But their reinsurer focused on the exposure, rather than the
individual coverages, so that evidences a belief that, if the base information
could be corrected, an agreement could be reached that was beneficial for
both.
Similarly, a senior official with the Texas Association of School
Boards, Inc.,102 also discussed direct influence from reinsurers, specifically
regarding underwriting of property and workers’ compensation coverages,
but mentioning other areas in general:
I do think [pools] are greatly influenced . . . by their
reinsurers’ wishes. That is particularly true for those pools
that have very low retentions and therefore pass off most of
the risk to their reinsurers. In those instances, claims
101

E-mail from senior official, Mo. Hous. Auths. Prop. & Cas., Inc., to
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (June 13, 2013, 3:00 PM CST) (on file with author).
102
This organization’s website, as the third party administrator for the TASB
Risk Management Fund, can be found at http://www.tasbrmf.org/ (last visited Dec.
27, 2014).
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handling, exposure collection, financial matters, even
underwriting criteria can be dictated by the reinsurer. Even
with our very high retentions, we experience this from time
to time. For example, after [hurricanes] Katrina, Rita and
Wilma hit [the Gulf Coast],103 the reinsurance community
became very concerned about the quality of construction of
the buildings they were reinsuring. They imposed
significantly more detailed reporting requirements on the
types of structures we were covering, what they were built
out of, how old they were, etc. Where before we were able
to just include the address and a general description of our
buildings on the schedule of values we submitted to the
reinsurers, all of a sudden we were required to obtain very
specific COPE104 information on every building. That
required us to significantly change the way we collect and
maintain our exposure information.
The second example is the requirement by our [workers’
compensation] reinsurer to start providing information on
the concentration of risk—the number of employees at any
one location. That change was implemented after the
Joplin tornado and the Alabama tornadoes hit a couple of
years ago. Workers’ compensation reinsurers realized that
103

See generally Hurricanes in History, NAT’L WEATHER SERVICE,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
104
COPE is “an acronym that stands for the four property risk characteristics
an underwriter reviews when evaluating a submission for property insurance:
Construction (e.g., frame, masonry, masonry veneer, superior construction,
mixed—masonry/frame); Occupancy (how the building is being used for
commercial property and whether it is owner-occupant or renter-occupied for
homeowners and the number of families for which the building is designed);
Protection (e.g., quality of the responding fire department including whether it is
paid or volunteer, adequacy of water pressure and water supply in the community,
distance of the structure to the nearest fire station, quality of the fire hydrant, and
the distance of the structure to the nearest hydrant); and Exposure (risks of loss
posed by neighboring property or the surrounding area, taking into consideration
what is located near the property, such as an office building, a subdivision, or a
fireworks factory).” COPE, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., RISK AND INS.,
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/c/cope.aspx (last visited
Dec. 27, 2014).
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they may not have accurate information on the number of
total people exposed to a devastating event, especially if
they write several large employers in a single
community. So now, we are providing information by
location and address of the number of employees working
at each location.105
While her examples mention underwriting influence in both
workers’ compensation and property, she does feel there is a broader
influence, including claims and finances. The examples the official gave
were both exposure oriented. Note the reinsurers insisted on detailed
information, which they had not previously required, a new parameter for
the relationship. It was provided willingly by the pool, since the
relationship was more valuable than the expense or trouble to obtain the
information. In exchange, the pool retained the necessary reinsurance
coverage.
A senior official with the County Commissioners Association of
Pennsylvania,106 emphasized underwriting influence, noting:
We do have lots of discussion [with our reinsurer] about
coverage issues and underwriting. A recent example was
the conversion of the entire Equipment Breakdown (Boiler
and Machinery) section of our Coverage Document, which
was outdated and was based on wording provided by a
prior [re]insurer. Our current reinsurer assisted us with
wording to match their reinsurance coverage, and reviewed
the results before we sent the Coverage Document to the
membership . . . [we] have our own Coverage Document
and we review the changes we would like to make in the
document with them. They are trusted advisors.107

105

E-mail from senior official, TASB, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (May
8, 2013, 10:05 AM CST) (on file with author).
106
The County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania website is
available at http://www.pacounties.org/Insurance/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Dec. 27, 2014).
107
E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc. (June 13, 2013, 8:50 AM CST) (on file with author).
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This official focused on the coverages, and worked with the
reinsurer to verify that the reinsurer could use their coverage agreement to
follow the carrier’s fortunes accurately. The pool accepts their input, even
to the point of considering the reinsurer a business advisor. This appears to
be an accepted form of governance as to this pool.
A senior official with the Park District Risk Management
Agency108 indicates underwriting influence as well. Additionally, he makes
a specific point that underlies many of the responses—that reinsurer
influence occurs over a period of years in the relationship, rather than
reinsurers making specific demands. He notes:
For PDRMA, the influence of reinsurers has accumulated
over time as opposed to a specific reinsurer telling us that
we needed to do certain things in order to procure
reinsurance coverage. For example, we have refined the
data we collect from our members over the years in order
to have the ‘right’ data so that an underwriter can
understand our exposures and properly price them. That
‘right’ data varies from reinsurer to reinsurer and can also
vary with market cycles, i.e. hard109 versus soft market.110
This points to the same focus as felt by the Missouri pool, although
it happened over a number of years. The reinsurer used their influence to
get the carrier to obtain the ‘right’ (by that reinsurer’s standards) data. This
official also mentions that the data collected can vary by reinsurer or
market conditions—regardless, the reinsurer is affecting the pool (by
dictating what data is collected), which complies in order to obtain the
product.
108

The Park District Risk Management Agency website is available at
https://www.pdrma.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
109
A hard market is one side of the insurance market cycle that is
characterized by high rates, low limits, and restricted coverage. Hard Market,
INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., RISK AND INS., http://www.irmi.com/online/insuranceglossary/terms/h/hard-market.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
110
A soft market is one side of the insurance market cycle that is characterized
by low rates, high limits, flexible contracts, and the high availability of coverage.
RISK
MGMT.
INST.,
RISK
AND
INS.:
Soft
Market,
INT’L
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/s/soft-market.aspx
(last
visited Dec. 27, 2014); E-mail from senior official, Park Dist. Risk Mgmt. Agency,
to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (July 6, 2013, 1:38 PM CST) (on file with author).
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Other pooling executives felt there was less underwriting influence
by reinsurers. A senior official at Ashton Tiffany, LLC, the third party
administrator for the Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc.,111
mentions the interaction and exchange regarding underwriting. He
indicated:
It depends on the maturity of the pool and the experience
level of the pool staff, but we have a balanced scale of give
and take with our reinsurers. The . . . Trust is a mature
property and casualty pool with over twenty years’
experience . . . negotiating with reinsurers.
The Trust has our own coverage agreements which are
reviewed and adjusted each year based on our claims
experience and evolving case law. We forward the draft
revised coverage agreement to our lead reinsurance
partners and ask for their feedback. Although we do not
always incorporate their suggestions, we appreciate and
value their feedback. We believe this provides multiple
viewpoints on coverage and also creates a solid working
relationship with our [reinsurers]. We also ask for their
feedback with emerging issues coming from the reinsurers’
book of business other than our account specifically. This
helps us to be proactive with coverage issues for our
members instead of being reactive . . .
As a mature pool, our reinsurers typically do not try to
influence us on our underwriting decisions. The only
influence our reinsurance carriers have on underwriting
procedures is if certain exclusions are adopted into the
agreement with the Trust. Recently, we had this very
situation arise regarding high-level ropes courses offered
by some of our members. One reinsurer wanted to exclude
coverage for all ropes courses. We stood firm and
reasoned with them that it would require additional time to
remove the exposure and, if not removing the exposures,
we would provide extensive loss control measures to
111

The Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc., website is available at
https://www.svc.the-trust.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
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reduce the exposure. The agreement resulted in the
reinsurer dropping their proposed exclusion.112
While this official felt there was minimal influence, he also noted
the depth of the relationship necessary to get to that point. It is unlikely a
new reinsurer of the Trust would be willing to cede all influence until they
were comfortable with the Trust’s operation. Additionally, while he feels
influence is minimal, it does not appear so. He mentions a fair amount of
ongoing interaction between his staff and the reinsurer, as well as the value
of their feedback. Feedback that is valued and sought seems to indicate a
greater influence than a simple commodity transaction. Note how the
relationship is always there, affecting every transaction. While this official
might not characterize it as such, this level of interaction appears to be
reinsurer governance.
A senior official with the Maryland Association of Boards of
Education113 felt there was less influence in his operation as well. He
notes:
Our pools are influenced somewhat by reinsurers . . . Our
Pool [School Board Legal] coverage is a manuscript
policy. When we first went to this reinsurer they ‘blessed’
the policy with a couple of minor changes we were fine
with and we just handle our claims . . . The only influence
was on our School Board Legal policy whereas the
reinsurer came on the risk they indicated they would not
reinsure an exposure we covered, so we changed our policy
to be in conformance with what they wanted. It was
actually a small matter which has not caused any specific
issues.114
While not initially noting influence, it appears that their policies
are reviewed by reinsurers to make sure the reinsurer wishes to follow this

112

E-mail from senior official, Ashton Tiffany, LLC, to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc. (June 24, 2013, 10:19 PM CST) (on file with author).
113
The Maryland Association of Boards of Education website is available at
http://www.mabe.org/insurance-programs/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
114
E-mails from, senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc. (June 14, 2013, 1:37 PM CST, 2:31 PM CST) (on file with author).
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pool’s fortune. As we will see later, this is not the last word from this
official about the importance of the relationship.
A senior official from the Idaho Counties Risk Management
Program115 felt there was little influence. He stated:
Our experience at ICRMP and in my discussion with peers,
regarding reinsurance relationships, leaves me with the
impression reinsurers do not influence pools directly. We
have not had specific requests to amend coverage . . . or
otherwise alter our pool operations to fit reinsurer’s needs.
Certainly there is underwriting exposure data that must be
provided such as payroll, property values, and other basic
underwriting info and claims must be reported to
reinsurers, however, ground level operations are left up to
the pool.116
While this official felt there was no influence on pools directly, he
did not say there was none at all. He notes the underwriting data “that must
be provided” and considers it ordinary. Nevertheless, these seem to be
similar requests made of other pools (perhaps not as detailed) and those
officials felt they were influenced by such requests. While this official may
feel no direct influence outside the expected underwriting issues, it appears
those very underwriting influences form the core of the influence. If the
underwriting information were no longer transmitted as required, it appears
from these comments that reinsurance would no longer be offered. This
seems like voluntary governance—if this data is not provided, the
reinsurance product will cease to be available, or certainly more costly.
A senior official with the Alabama Trust for Boards of
Education117 self-funded pool mentioned underwriting, stating:
My observations have been that reinsurers influence pool
formation and operations in areas of financial management,
underwriting, and claims management. [Reinsurers] are . .
115

The Idaho Counties Risk Management Program website is available at
http://www.icrmp.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
116
E-mail from senior official, Idaho Cntys. Risk Mgmt. Program, to Assistant
Dir., TASB, Inc. (June 17, 2013, 3:47 PM CST) (on file with author).
117
The Alabama Trust for Boards of Education website is available at
http://www.dwighthester.com/ATBE.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
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. concerned from an underwriting standpoint about nature
and scope of coverage, as well as pricing for coverage.118
While this official’s comments are more general, his impression is
that reinsurers do influence pool underwriting operations, mostly from the
coverage standpoint, which relates back to the follow the fortunes aspect.
The reinsurer has to make sure the cedent’s interests align with theirs.
As to reinsurers’ underwriting influence, the current senior official
of AGRiP indicates a wide range of influence:
Pools absolutely have accepted input from the reinsurers to
influence their practices, operations – even policies. This
can be very subtle. For example, a reinsurer might ask,
when underwriting a pool, if they have policies and
procedures for cancelling or non-renewing a member that
will not comply with loss control requirements. I have
known pools without such formal procedures to develop
them, not because their reinsurer ‘required’ it, but because
they recognized [the procedure] as a good proactive
[policy], and they wanted to make themselves more
attractive to reinsurers in the future. Other areas I have
seen influenced by reinsurers include rating and pricing;
building and holding adequate surplus; better claim
management procedures; and coverage issues, to name a
few.119
These comments appear to verify that even suggestions from
reinsurers, because of their broader market knowledge and experience, take
on a great deal of influence, even though they were not requirements. This
official continues:
Reinsurers . . . have provided pools with general advice
through forums, [such as] AGRiP conferences. For
118

E-mail from senior official, Ala. Trust for Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc. (June 20, 2013, 2:44 PM CST) (on file with author).
119
E-mail from current senior official, Ass’n of Governmental Risk Pools
(AGRiP), to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (Apr. 29, 2013, 11:09 AM CST) (on file
with author).
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example, reinsurers have produced [conference] sessions
on how to effectively partner with your reinsurer. The
sessions gave input on things to include in the underwriting
submission, such as: evidence of pool policies that require
members to embrace loss control advice or risk being nonrenewed; information about rating plans that include
experience rating to incent better risk management; [and]
operational structures that demonstrate an alignment of
incentives between staff or vendors with the goal of
reducing losses, as opposed to a managing general
underwriter structure where the vendor is incented to grow
the top line with no skin in the game for the bottom line.120
These conference programs appear to be the first truly indirect
form of reinsurer influence discussed by a participant.121 While
understandably, reinsurers give such presentations to assist pools in
becoming more efficient and more able to be reinsured (and to raise the
reinsurers’ visibility), they are also attempting on a broader scale to
influence pools in general. This training potentially makes the reinsurance
market more accessible to pools, and more expansive and profitable for
reinsurers.
As to underwriting, the former senior official with AGRiP
indicated:
[Underwriting] suggestions generally are subtle ‘strong
hints’, such as reinsurers indicating they could lower the
premium by X dollars if members were required, under the
coverage agreement, to confer with a pool designated
defense counsel before taking any adverse employment
actions. Or, for example, if coverage excluded diving
boards over five meters high. Or, if coverage excluded
playground equipment on hard surfaces such as asphalt or
concrete.122
120

E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc.
(June 10, 2013, 7:11 AM CST) (on file with author).
121
Arguably, these presentations take a similar form as the “University of
Farmers” insurance commercials.
122
E-mail from former senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc.
(May 24, 2013, 2:26 PM CST) (on file with author).
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All of the examples are incentive-based; while assisting the pool in
having fewer losses, they also minimize severity, and the chance the
reinsurers’ thresholds are broken. However, this appears to be the same
type of influence as when your local government offers lower water rates
per gallon for more frugal usage. Also, note the use of the term ‘subtle’ by
both AGRiP officials. This will be seen next as well.
A reinsurer underwriter for the Government Entities Mutual,
Inc.,123 indicated reinsurers did have a substantive impact on pools. He
focused on the underwriting influence:
I would say over time, reinsurers are moving from direct
influence to indirect influence. This seems to be a function
of the market conditions, and in this extended soft market
(since post-9/11), reinsurers’ demands of their reinsureds
are becoming more and more requests. This is, of course,
related to not wanting to give up market share [or] being
perceived . . . that [reinsurance] coverage is based on a set
of operational demands.
[As to influence], Government Entities Mutual, Inc. has a
pricing methodology that includes schedule credits which
reward/penalize our member pools for practicing ‘good’
risk behavior and not practicing ‘bad’ risk behavior. A
little more about this: the [reinsurance underwriting]
categories allow up to +/-15% debits/credits. The several
categories are both subjective and relatively objective. The
metrics for each category are definitely subjectively chosen
by GEM staff. For instance: being AGRiP ‘recognized’124
affords -1% off the written premium. GEM has
determined that going through the self-evaluation process
of the AGRiP recognition process is an indicator of a good
risk pool. Remember, GEM is assessing the risk of the
pool, while pools are assessing the risk of its
members. So, the fact that we have correlated risk with

123

The Government Entities Mutual, Inc., website is available at
http://www.gemre.com/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
124
See generally ASS’N OF GOVERNMENTAL RISK POOLS, WWW.agrip.org (last
visited Dec. 27, 2014) (for a detailed discussion of debits and credits).
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AGRiP recognition is relatively objective, but the metric of
-1%/0/+1% [for varying categories] is subjective.
Speaking outside of GEM, I know that reinsurers pricing
models have a lot more ‘wiggle’ room than GEM’s +/15%. Some up to 40%. The rationale for this is the
limited ability of their experience and exposure based
pricing methods, usually blaming the pool’s lack of
experience in the reinsurance layers [for] not being able to
credibly predict risk and therefore [being able to] predict
pricing. Each reinsurer has their own ‘wiggle’
methodology, but ultimately they are looking to assess the
soft risk elements versus the cold, hard black and white of
the losses and exposure counts. Specifically, I know other
reinsurers collect a lot of the same soft data that GEM
collects, such as claims audits, tort climates, and
underwriting guidelines.
Specific input might come in the way of reinsurer
audits. For instance, most reinsurers want at least a claims
audit and underwriting audit of the reinsured before they
write the business. Within the audits are pros and cons of
the reinsured’s operations, as well as ways to
improve. When subsequent audits are performed, the first
thing an auditor usually looks at are the ‘management
recommendations’ from the previous audit. These point to
whether management has been responsive to the reinsurers
recommendations. The majority of the reinsurers want
financially solvent pools, so they target the major
contributors to that end. Underwriting and claims are the
biggest two, followed by loss control and accounting.
Because a well-functioning pool has [their own] long term
underwriting and rating standards, and [these pools]
attempt to minimize claims payouts by proactively
defending frivolous and calamitous claims.125
125

E-mails from reinsurance underwriter, Gov’t Entities Mut., Inc., to
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:12 AM EST and May 9, 2013, 3:08
PM CST) (on file with author).
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This underwriter outlines a very good overview of how reinsurer
incentives operate. Reinsurers want to give premium discounts, as this
assists reinsurers in their influence of pools. Reinsurers are attempting to
influence pools to have lower loss ratios, since, under the follow the
fortunes doctrine, this is optimal for both parties, although more so for the
reinsurer. This underwriter seems to encourage transparency and good
faith in the underwriting process for the benefit of both. This appears to be
a very substantial argument for reinsurer underwriting influence on pools.
As to the underwriting influence overall, the general
characterization of reinsurer influence was characterized by the participants
as ‘indirect.’ However, while the influence is not as direct as it could be,
being influenced by reinsurers’ suggestions, even subtle ones, appears to be
a form of direct influence, unlike the indirect influence of conference
programs. There appears to be, direct or subtle, very much a governance
aspect to the reinsurers’ actions.
2. Claims
The area of claims differs from underwriting in that it is more
subjective, from a reinsurer’s standpoint. The reinsurer influence varies
based on many more factors in claims, as can be seen from participant’s
responses.
The senior official for the Alabama Trust for Boards of Education
indicated:
[Reinsurers] are particularly interested in how claims are
managed and by whom. They are interested enough in [the
pools’] claims management that they typically conduct
regular, periodic audits of all claim files that may in any
way pose exposure to the re-insurance layer of coverage.126
The claim audits are a theme that will arise repeatedly. Because
reinsurers can’t get an objective view of claims by reserve numbers or
claim counts, they must actually touch the files to ensure that the pool is
overseeing the claims in a reasonable fashion. Additionally, pool personnel
must meet with reinsurer personnel—this is partly for explanations of files,
126

E-mail from senior official, Ala. Trust for Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc. supra note 118.
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as well as to investigate the capabilities of the claim staff. These oversight
actions are governance (or regulatory) in nature.
The senior official for the County Commissioners Association of
Pennsylvania indicated:
In our experience, [influence] is not about specific
operational matters and never about specifics of personnel.
But it could be about staffing (levels of loss control
services for example) and, since we provide claims
services, [reinsurers] are interested in our claims staff
performance. We provide member satisfaction survey
results and copies of claims audits so they can have factual
information about our service quality.127
Here we see interest in claim staff performance again—the
reinsurer wishes to oversee, to some degree, the subjective, and the pool
agrees to this oversight.
A former senior official with the Washington Schools Risk
Management Pool128 emphasized some reinsurance influence on claim
operations, indicating:
Pools influenced by reinsurers . . . it depends. We take
recommendations from any reinsurer claims audit very
seriously, especially as it relates to claims industry
practices. We just had our two reinsurers complete their
annual claims audit and we are following up on a
recommendation to tighten up on reserve documentation.
The reserve documentation was in the form of a
recommendation and not as a strict requirement. But I do
think it is important to maintain a good working
relationship with our reinsurer and would comply with

127

E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 107.
128
The Washington Schools Risk Management Pool website is available at
http://www.wsrmp.com/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
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their recommendations if they make good business sense,
as the reserve documentation recommendation was. 129
As this official indicates, they take the audits “very” seriously from
their reinsurer, and it appears annual audits are required.
The
recommendation arising from the audit was not put forth as a requirement.
The recommendation was a formal suggestion, and the pool gave it
consideration because it made sense, but also indicated acceptance because
of the need for a good working relationship. While this official may feel
less influence, regularly accepted audits (even if contractually required)
and a desire to maintain the relationship (which are not contractually
required) indicates a fair degree of influence from the reinsurer.
A senior official with the Montana School Group Insurance
Authority,130 the administrator for the Montana School Board Association’s
program, felt both underwriting, in coverage offerings, and claim
operations were most influenced, but focused on the claim operations as an
example. He said:
Pools are influenced by reinsurers. The right reinsurance
partner is critical for the long-term success of the primary
pool. The ability to provide stable and competitive
reinsurance costs [is] one of the largest pieces of the
primary pool’s pricing formula which in turn has a direct
impact on [how] competitive the primary pool can be in its
membership market space. The other is the right
reinsurance products for the primary pool. Often one
reinsurance carrier will not provide the right type of
coverage, coverage structure, or limits needed. So, to find
the perfect fit takes some work on the primary pool’s
part. For some pools that is a mono-state arrangement,
others it is multi-state, and some are countrywide. The
influence a reinsurance relationship has on the primary will
drive certain procedural behaviors with regard to both
129

E-mails from former senior official, Wash. Sch. Risk Mgmt. Pool, to
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (June 12, 2013, 12:09 PM EST and 3:34 PM CST) (on
file with author).
130
The Montana School Group Insurance Authority website is available at
http://www.msgia.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
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policy and procedural development in the areas that will be
impacted by the reinsurance pricing.
The best example is claim handling procedures and related
policies. Because the reinsurance submission process is
becoming more formalized as pooling development has
evolved, the primary pools are much more carefully
crafting claim handling procedures and policies which
model what they believe to be national best practices in
this area. The submission process involves sharing the
detailed outside or third party claim audit reports of your
operations with your reinsurance partner as well as your
own state and local pool claim guidelines and
procedures. A reinsurer then analyzes these procedures
and compares them with the outcomes seen in the claim
data sets acquired from the primary pool as part of the
reinsurance submission process. While the reinsurance
does not have any direct control over the primary pool with
regard to mandates for changes in the primary pool
procedures, suggestions are offered. The reinsurers I have
worked with provide those based on multiple operations
they have worked with and offer what they believe to be
the best practices. So, it is the indirect influence or
regulator feel provided through the reinsurance relationship
that creates certain behaviors in pooling operations. The
larger the pool, the more procedures and staff that are
involved, [then] the larger the interactions [are] between
the reinsurance carrier and the primary pool.
Influence on coverage issues I have still seen [are] driven
by the type of reinsurance/excess contract, with the
reinsurance style contracts affording the settlement
authority to the primary pools. Our pool, as do many, still
involve the reinsurer as the claim progresses and even in
the final decision making process of settlement versus
continued defense. Reporting requirements in the contracts
with the reinsurers ensures they get to be involved prior to
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the self-insured retention131 being breached for most
instances. We have been involved with several liability
claims where we have received very good input from the
reinsurance legal group regarding ways to approach and
structure defenses for our primary pool members. Our
defense counsel for the pool has usually been very
receptive to that type of input.132
Note how this senior official continues to go back to the benefits of the
relationship, the early involvement of the reinsurer, and the claim specific
advice. He mentions “suggestions are offered” that “create certain
behaviors”; governance creates certain behaviors as well. Regardless of the
example of influence he is discussing, or if one would consider it direct or
indirect, it is very apparent both parties perceive their relationship to be one
of utmost good faith, rather than the arms-length relationship contemplated
by some reinsurance commentators previously documented.
A senior official with the North Carolina School Boards
Association, the third party administrator for the North Carolina School
Boards Trust133 felt there was reinsurer claims influence:
Yes, [there is influence], at least to some extent. I think
the level of reinsurer influence is in part dependent on the
sophistication level of the pool staff and also probably the
size of the pool.134 Smaller pools with less experienced,
less sophisticated staff are likely to be more receptive to
131

A self-insured retention (SIR) is defined as: “A dollar amount specified in
a liability insurance policy that must be paid by the insured before the insurance
policy will respond to a loss. Thus, under a policy written with a SIR provision, the
insured (rather than the insurer) would pay defense and/or indemnity costs
associated with a claim until the SIR limit was reached. After that point, the
insurer would make any additional payments for defense and indemnity that were
covered by the policy.” Self-Insured Retention (SIR), INT’L RISK MGMT. INST.,
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/s/self-insured-retentionsir.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014) (emphasis in original).
132
E-mail from senior official, Mont. Sch. Grp. Ins. Auth., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc. (June 18, 2013, 10:34 AM CST) (on file with author).
133
The North Carolina School Boards Trust website is available at,
http://www.ncsba.org/risk-management/the-north-carolina-school-boards-trust/
(last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
134
This factor will be seen again.
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reinsurer suggestions on changes to improve internal claim
procedures or with handling coverage and reservation of
rights issues, or other internal changes.135
While this official did not seem to be referring to her own pool, it seems
natural that less experienced pools would be more willing to accept
guidance from business partners, using reinsurers’ governance to their
advantage.
The senior official from the Park District Risk Management
Agency mentioned claims in detail:
The reinsurers do review our claims procedures, but
mainly from the point of view that they want to be
confident that we have competent staff, have specific
internal controls in place, and the process is
documented. While we write our reinsurance agreements
so that, in most cases, PDRMA retains the ability to
control the claim, we do have specific reporting procedures
to the reinsurer and in some cases need written approval
prior to settling a claim. We comply with those
requirements and try to be much more proactive and
cooperative with the reinsurers when they may be paying
on a claim.136
This certainly is direct influence; the most interesting example is the
reinsurer’s insistence to go beyond ‘follow the fortunes’, in that in some
instances the reinsurer must sign off on certain settlements. These
reinsurer ‘requirements’ are complied with proactively by the pool, and
appear to be behavior changing influence, governing in nature. Again, this
influence, or governance, is freely accepted by the pool.
The senior official representing the Arizona School Risk Retention
Trust, Inc., discussed the large amount of interaction their claim personnel
had with their reinsurer:
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E-mail from senior official, N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc. (July 8, 2013, 2:48 PM CST) (on file with author).
136
E-mail from senior official, Park Dist. Risk Mgmt. Agency, to Assistant
Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 110.
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Our . . . lead liability claims adjuster, along with our lead
defense counsel, meets with our reinsurers in person twice
a year to conduct intensive case reviews. [The adjuster]
also provides updates throughout the year as reserves
change. We recently had three large liability claims that
reached into the reinsurance layers.
The ultimate
settlements negotiated by our adjuster were less than the
reinsurers reserves amounts by approximately 30% to 50%
of the reinsurers’ total reserves. These results build our
credibility with the reinsurers and illustrate that we do not
fall victim to unnecessary influence from the reinsurers.
Our lead property adjuster also has a terrific working
relationship with our reinsurers. The Trust members have
experienced some substantial and unusual claims in recent
years. The lead property adjuster has spent many hours
negotiating with our members and with the reinsurer.
Arizona is a state that is much different from other states
when it comes to weather which results in claims from our
members. We recently have had some major hail damage
and water intrusion claims that were closed for much less
than the reinsurer expected. The lead property reinsurer
had to explain how flooding in Arizona, which is typically
sheet flooding, is much different than flooding in other
states. Having a good working relationship with the
reinsurer made for much smoother claims resolutions.137
In allowing the heightened interaction to avoid ‘unnecessary influence’
(and to create a good business relationship), are pools, by this very act,
allowing some measure of governance? While this official may not
characterize it as such, this ongoing monitoring and level of interaction
with the reinsurer appears to be a sign of reinsurer governance.
The senior official with the Maryland Association of Boards of
Education felt there was little influence in his operation. He notes:
For the run of the mill claims we handle and know the
value will not approach the retention, the reinsurer is
137

E-mail from senior official, Ashton Tiffany, LLC, to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc., supra note 112.
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uninvolved. And the vast number of claims we handle are
well below our retentions and therefore do not involve the
reinsurers. We handle the claims, determine the coverage
and extend authority without reinsurance involvement.
The reinsurer only gets involved when the value of the
claim makes it reportable to them or the claim meets
certain criteria, sometimes for severity.138
This official has seen much less influence in claims, indicating little of the
interaction mentioned by others.
The current official with AGRiP noted claim audits and
recommendations:
On the specific level [regarding claims], in meetings
between the pool management and reinsurers, there is often
discussion of specific claims, how they were handled, and
how similar claims might be better handled in the future.
Through reinsurer claim audits, specific recommendations
of better staffing or supervisory models might be given.
For example, one reinsurer requested that the pool hire a
full time litigation manager to oversee the third party
administrator and [outside] legal counsel to control
litigation costs and improve outcomes. [Or], in the review
of the coverage documents, concerns about interpretation
of language might arise. One specific example that has
come up several times in my experience relates to the
determination of the date of loss and number of ‘events’ in
situations such as sexual abuse in a school system, which
led to clarification of language. Often the reinsurer might
recommend things, and the pool may or may not make the
change and the reinsurer may or may not continue to write
the account.139
This official sees specific claim handling input by reinsurers, even staffing
requests. As she indicates, the pool might accept the recommendations or
138

E-mail from senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 114.
139
E-mail from current senior official, Ass’n of Governmental Risk Pools
(AGRiP), to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 120.
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might not, but if it does, it seems to be accepting a form of governance in
the process.
The former AGRiP senior official gave a response that showed not
only the method of influence, the pool’s effort in a claims setting towards
utmost good faith:
A secondary influence is what [reinsurers] establish as
thresholds for reporting claims to them; and how reinsurers
influence claims adjustment at the pool level. Reinsurers
influence can be limited at times. For example, reinsurers
seem to have a hard time understanding why public entity
pools are willing to spend more money on defense than
[third party] claim payments.140 I remember years ago [at a
previous employer] having a study done of our in-house
Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group141 litigation
management program. The consultants said we were not
doing a very effective job because we were spending $7 for
litigation for each $3 in losses; when it should have been
the other way - $3/$7. When I asked about how much we
spent in total compared to others they replied, ‘Oh, about
one-third.’ I was very pleased that our strategy was
working so well.142
This official, while acknowledging reinsurers can manipulate claim
reporting and how claims are adjusted, also showed that by a pool
demonstrating utmost good faith, the influence is lessened. Here, the pool
showed their institutional reasoning and success in the defense of claims,
and the reinsurer appears to have been accepting, showing utmost good
faith in kind. But the governance is still present.
140

It is the author’s experience this is due to the common interests of pool
members. Pools do not want certain types of claims to be settled, no matter how
economically feasible because governmental entity settlements are well publicized.
Settlements can also cause ripple effects of further litigation against other similarly
situated pool members, where members feel there is no liability in a particular
situation or members are defending a common policy position, such as dress codes.
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The Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group website is available at
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The underwriter for the Government Entities Mutual, Inc., spoke of
claim audits as well:
[W]e determine the effectiveness of a GEM member
[pool’s] claims operation by assessing [our] claims
audit. [W]e correlate the risk to the reinsurance layer to
the effectiveness of the claims operation. [In the claims]
category, its measure and metric are much more subjective,
since all claims operations behave very differently.143
The GEM underwriter points out the subjective nature of reinsurance
oversight of claim operations. It appears this very subjectivity allows for
governance to be asserted and accepted by the pools.
The senior official with the Missouri Housing Authorities Property
and Casualty, Inc., noted:
I have not received any reinsurer suggestions on claim
procedures, coverage issue handling, or authority . . . these
matters are handled in accordance with and subject to the
pool’s coverage document, which is provided to the
reinsurer in advance of its decision to enter into a treaty
with the pool.144
This appeared to be the least claim influence of those that opined; much
less so than the underwriting influence this pool felt.
Due to the subjectivity in the reinsurer oversight of claim
operations, reinsurers have more opportunities in claims for governance.
Because of the imprecise nature of claim operations—which can vary
widely based on claim philosophies, enforcement of those philosophies,
experience of the personnel, and workload—reinsurers usually must have a
greater hands-on approach when determining the amount of governance to
insist upon. As most of the participants indicated, there was a great deal of
interaction, which appears to be governance.
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E-mail from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc. (April 30, 2013, 11:12 AM CST) (on file with author).
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E-mail from senior official, Mo. Hous. Auths. Prop. & Cas., Inc., to
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 101.
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3. Finance/Solvency
While not as many comments discussed directly the financial
aspect of pooling, or at least not that could be easily unwound from other
subjects, the comments given showed finances of the pool and the
profitability of the reinsurers as strong motivating factors for reinsurers to
assert some form of governance over the pools.
The senior official with the Texas Association of School Boards,
Inc., stated:
I also believe that most pools, like any organization, are
driven by an inherent desire to survive, so financial
viability is a powerful motivator . . . I think reinsurance
plays an important part in the financial viability of a pool,
but more from a funding and claims protection standpoint
than a regulatory standpoint. Although, as stated earlier,
reinsurers carry a big stick, so to the extent that they want
to impose certain practices by a pool, the pool is likely to
comply.145
While this official mentions that the important part of a reinsurers influence
is not regulatory in nature, it may only be semantically different. The
imposition of certain practices is certainly governance in nature; ‘sway’ as
the Oxford English Dictionary termed it.146
The senior official of the Alabama Trust for Boards of Education
discussed the reinsurers’ interest in the pools’ finances:
Because of the obvious financial self-interest, reinsurers
are concerned about the financial condition and status of
any pool, whether start-up or well-established . . . My
personal observations concerning multiple pools of various
sizes in multiple states is that, again, due to financial selfinterest, re-insurers sometimes have more hands-on
involvement and influence in the solvency and success of

145

E-mail from senior official, TASB, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc.
(April 30, 2013, 9:59 AM CST) (on file with author).
146
“Governance” definition, supra note 2.
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public entity pools that any insurance or administrative
regulators would have.147
As this official obliquely notes, state regulators are concerned about an
entity’s solvency in an abstract manner. For reinsurers, it is their money
and their livelihoods at stake. This greatly increases the incentive to assert
influence.
The GEM underwriter also noted reinsurers gaining a greater
understanding of pools and an increased interest in writing pools:
Plain and simple: profit. Reinsurers, as any financial
institution, [are] looking to make return with their
capital. Pools and the risk of public entities have proved
profitable. Pools, as an industry, have matured to the point
with reinsurers [not being] as skeptical of them as they
were at the beginning . . . Perhaps this is indirectly related
to the ‘suggestions’ made by the reinsurers, or just a
natural evolution of any industry.
There are new ‘shops’ set up recently trying to go after
pool business. This means it is profitable. This also means
that the reinsurance community is becoming more and
more enamored of pools . . . [T]here is a comfort level with
pools that has grown over time. I would say this is mostly
restricted to the domestic marketplace, since on the
international scene, most reinsurers are largely unaware of
the public entity pooling industry.
Yes, there are strengths and weaknesses of pools just like
any other risk. One opinion I have is that the insurance
shortage crisis that existed back in the 80’s, in which the
pools were born,148 is not likely to return. Insurers and
reinsurers are well aware that public sector risk is a good
book of business . . . I think this stems from two
147

E-mail from senior official, Ala. Trust for Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 118.
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components of pools. First, they are mutually owned by
public entities, and most of the time are run in the best
interest of the actual risk. Second, over the history of
pooling, there have been far fewer insolvencies than the
commercial insurance industry. As proof, in the last
couple of years, there are three new reinsurance shops that
have started writing public entity pools around the
country. These are private companies who did not
formerly write in the space, and it can only be deduced that
there is profit to be made.149
Based on the underwriter’s comments, he believes pools have matured to
the point that reinsurers’ are interested in this segment of the market, which
may be leading to less direct influence, as noted earlier. The more
reinsurer competition, the less each reinsurer can assert its direct influence.
However, because finances are growing stronger in the pooling industry,
the reinsurers have every motivation to keep the pools as efficient as
possible. It appears the reinsurers are matching the level of governance
influence to individual pools, and the methods can vary as to how they
achieve these goals.
Not everyone felt a close pooling-reinsurer relationship in the
financial area. The senior official with the Idaho Counties Risk
Management Program stated:
For better or worse, I predict pools’ relationships with
reinsurance . . . markets will continue to be more data
driven and less personal. I also believe reinsurers will
continue to view pool business more as a market to be in or
out of and this will lead to service behaviors more in line
with a commodity rather than a personalized financial
product priced on the underlying pool’s operational
competence.150
However, it seems clear the reinsurers’ approach observed by this
official would be less influential—after all, the less engagement,
149

E-mails from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc., supra note 125.
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the less influence that can be asserted from a distance. If reinsurers
were to trend towards less engagement, it would be counterproductive to the overall reinsurance process.
4. General/Miscellaneous
There were a few comments of a more general nature, but
enlightening nonetheless.
The senior official with the County Commissioners Association of
Pennsylvania said:
Yes, I think this is somewhat natural [that pools are
influenced by reinsurers], if pools believe as we do, that
reinsurers are partners in our program. There are not a
large number of reinsurers interested in public entity
exposures, especially some of the more niche coverages
like law enforcement (police, jails, probation) and nursing
home professional liability. Pools cannot afford to treat
reinsurers like they are just another vendor, which can
easily be replaced. We expect our members to view our
pool as a long-term commitment, and we extend that same
philosophy to our reinsurers. We meet with them every
year to discuss the renewal, but just as importantly to get
their feedback, to find out what is new in the industry.151
Note that there is organizational commitment passed through from the
member to the pool to the reinsurer. Additionally, this senior official
indicates the preference to have reinsurers as partners, rather than as a
commodity. Because of their differing roles, a certain amount of influence
inevitably occurs when reinsurers have a financial interest in the pools’
performances. Much like neighbors looking after each other’s houses,
there is some inherent interest in making sure all is well.
The underwriter for the Government Entities Mutual, Inc., the
reinsurer, indicated:
I don’t think it is possible to influence specific behavior of
pool employees/third party administrator personnel, but
151
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[reinsurers can influence the] general goals and metrics for
the entire company. For instance, we offer a discount on
premiums for financial loss ratios being under, say,
100%. There are a number of ways to achieve this,
including loss control requirements, claims management
procedures, coverage offerings/issues, and/or rate
adequacy. So, by offering that carrot, we are incentivizing
a steady business model and solvent pools, but how the
pool accomplishes that, and with what employees, is their
decision.152
Again, this is the softer approach that yields potentially broader results by
agreement with the pools. But all of his examples are regulatory in nature,
even if voluntarily accepted.
As a final note for Part A, the former senior official with AGRiP
stated:
As I have observed and worked with pools the past 34
years, I came to the realization that reinsurers do in fact
‘call the shots’ for the vast majority of pools; although a
number of pool officials would argue to the contrary. But
since most pools assume very little risk they are at the
mercy of the reinsurance community when developing
coverage terms and rates.153
This statement encompasses a great deal of the initial findings for this Part
regarding the impact of reinsurers on pools generally, and specifically on
their underwriting, claims and finance operations. “Calling the shots”, as
this official described it, and the pools’ acceptance of this approach,
certainly seems to be reinsurer governance.
In this sub-Part, there were various characterizations by the
participants of reinsurers’ influence on pools, mostly in underwriting and
claims. However, these interviews, to this author, demonstrate that the
governance effect—the behavior changing ability—by reinsurers has been
substantively felt among the pooling market. The degree of influence may
152
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be situational, but seems constant as to most pools. As we will see in this
next sub-Part, there is a great deal more consensus as to the core of the
relationship, the utmost good faith concept.
B.

DUTY OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH

A second point, “utmost good faith,” arose from this examination
of reinsurer influence. In an era when courts are struggling with the
traditional concept of utmost good faith between reinsured and reinsurer,
are the parties to reinsurance contracts themselves moving away from the
utmost good faith concept of long intertwined relationships built on trust?
Are we seeing a move throughout the industry towards an arms-length
transaction between two sophisticated parties? Are cedents pushing
reinsurers away from simple treaty agreements and towards sophisticated
reinsurance agreements?154 Simply put, are cedents treating reinsurance like
a commodity, and moving away from engaging in utmost good faith?
While the term “utmost good faith” was not used in any survey
questions, most of the respondents, unprompted, described the
transparency, trust and long-term relationships they felt with their current
reinsurers, as well as the engagement, education, and assistance they
received from their reinsurers—all hallmarks of uberrima fides. Utmost
good faith still appears to be a vibrant element in pooling. This seems to
show that utmost good faith is not only still relevant in this market, but also
necessary for the success of the relationship. Additionally, the pools
generally had the same high level of transparency and depth with their
reinsurers they had with their own members, the same “utmost good faith”
in both transactions. While some courts and authors believe that the utmost
good faith doctrine in reinsurance has gone past its usefulness,155 the
author’s research with pools indicates the concept of utmost good faith is
expanding, and is necessary for both parties to gain from the relationship.
Indeed, this advantage goes well beyond financial gain in pooling, for both
cedent and reinsurer.

154

It seems obvious that reinsurers who suspect their cedents are playing “hide
the ball” in violation of the spirit of utmost good faith are later going to take legal
steps to not follow the fortunes of their cedent.
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OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 69 at 3-22 (citing Unigard Sec. Ins.
Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F. 3d 1049, 1066, 2d Cir. (1993)). See also Thomas,
supra note 81.

2014

REINSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE

103

The current senior official of AGRiP said: “Over time, either a
good professional relationship of trust and mutual respect emerges, or not,
and this influences who does business with who.”156 Again, while there is
reinsurer influence, long-term relationships are what makes this truly
beneficial for both parties. This official indicates that if both parties cannot
influence the relationship, then perhaps they should not be in business
together.
The senior official for the North Carolina School Boards Trust
stated:
Another factor that may increase the level of reinsurer
influence (which is true in our case) is the length of the
reinsurer/pool relationship. We have worked with our
current reinsurer for the past six years, and over that
timeframe a mutual trust and respect has developed
between [the NCSB] Trust staff and reinsurer staff about
our programs and processes, as well as reinsurance
expectations. Because of the positive working relationship
that we have developed, both parties seem interested in
helping the other. When we have annual renewal
meetings, our reinsurer is very helpful in responding and
providing input to our plans for coverage changes and
other programmatic changes we might be contemplating,
without being too imposing or forcing changes on us. The
working relationship has been extremely positive, and even
though we initially felt that some of their reporting
expectations were a bit onerous, we now have a better
understanding of why they require us to report the way we
do. Generally, we have found the input from our reinsurer
to be helpful, and we try to accommodate them to continue
the positive relationship that we have with them. By the
same token, I think they try to accommodate us in certain
ways because they find the relationship worth the effort.157

156

E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc.,
supra note 120.
157
E-mail from senior official, N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc., supra note 135.
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Here, the reinsurer is seen as a valued partner, one with whom there is
mutual trust and respect, as well as a source of industry information. This
pool came to accept and understand the governance exerted by the
reinsurer. This realization of understanding the needs of the reinsurer made
the pool’s acceptance much easier, and led to a better relationship. This
greater interaction shows utmost good faith in the flow of information.
The former senior official with AGRiP stated:
[I] have also concluded that most in the reinsurance
community who are committed to the long-term success of
pools work very hard to appreciate the unique
characteristics of public entity exposures and
finances. This has developed as a symbiotic relationship,
although, in my opinion, reinsurers exert more influence
than pool officials generally are willing to concede. In the
late 70’s and early 80’s, I experienced any number of
reinsurance business executives who “knew better than the
public administrators” as to how to conduct an insurance
operation. Perhaps they did, but the public administrators
knew how to manage diversity – leading to the long-term
success of pooled risk management for public entities, of
which the “insurance” is just one component. One of my
signature phrases is “public entities cooperating together to
manage their risks is what differentiates pooling from
traditional insurance.”158
While mentioning the effect of reinsurer influence again, this is the
first mention of the “symbiotic” relationship, a concept that will come up
again later. It is this symbiosis that makes this relationship work; requiring
utmost good faith, as well an understanding of each other’s business
interests.
The senior official with the Maryland Association of School
Boards indicated:
We have always thought that providing reinsurers with
accurate data on the front-end will make us a pool they can
trust and work with. We work very hard to provide them
158
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with the data they need, so as to make it easy to write our
account.159
Again, this official solidifies the notion of trust as being paramount in this
relationship.
Transparency, a vital element of utmost good faith, seemed to be
very much on the respondents’ minds. The underwriter from GEM
attributed it to the origin of governmental entity pooling, when asked if
pools were more transparent than traditional insurers, from his reinsurance
point of view:
Absolutely. The first and obvious reason is that many
pools fall under various states’ freedom of information
acts, while traditional insurers are constantly developing
innovative and propriety products to beat their
competition. Secondly, although I have only been in
pooling for 8 years, it seems the culture of transparency
has been around since the beginning. This includes
transparency within the membership of each pool, as well
as within the pooling community around the country.160
It is this transparency that leads to the concept of utmost good faith being
not only possible, but embraced.
Transparency was again mentioned by the senior official from the
Texas Association of School Boards, Inc. She felt, like others, this
transparency began with the basis of pooling, open governments:
I believe most pools started out of a governmental mindset. They were started either by governmental associations
or by government employees. As a result, I think there
was an inherent sense of open operations, similar to open
government. That awareness that anyone can come in and
look at your operations, coupled with a general desire to
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‘do good’ resulted in a self-governance mind-set for most
pools.161
The transparency described is key to utmost good faith thriving—just the
knowledge by a reinsurer that the pool has this inherent philosophical
outlook builds confidence on the part of the reinsurer.
Probably the most interesting comment on the pool-reinsurer
relationship was from the senior official with the Montana School Group
Insurance Authority. Perhaps unknowingly, he addressed the doctrine of
utmost good faith in his detailed discussion of high-level relationships with
reinsurers:
The reinsurers seek what many of the primary pools seek
with their members—a long-term relationship with a
downstream member (customer) that is willing to listen to
the risk and claim management advice of their upstream
partner. If all three of the players in the relationship share
and deploy best practices with regard to these two
disciplines, then the relationship is bound to generate a
profitable relationship for all. Having a reinsurer that is
willing to get to know the primary pool operations, longterm goals and the management team can go a long way
with primary pool reinsurance pricing and willingness to
offer needed structural elements to meet the coverage
needs. Trust and relationships is as much a part of this
level of the business as the raw data sets. Both are
important but if you have the trust that your partner will do
the right things over the long-term to benefit all parties,
many times we can work through some of the years when
large claims arise and we get to know our reinsurance
partners in a manner closer than sometimes we would
like.162
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This official has embraced the doctrine of utmost good faith, and shown
that it has the potential to benefit all, rather than be a burden, as previously
indicated by some commentators.
The current AGRiP senior official notes the benefits of this twoway relationship as well:
However, I must note, I likewise know that pools have
influenced reinsurers’ understanding of, and underwriting
requirements for, writing pools. They have had to learn
that the pools’ mission is to reduce risk, not create
underwriting profit, and this has changed reinsurance
practices for those who really have a stake in pooling.163
This official has seen the broader influence of the utmost good faith
effect—an entire section of the market can be better understood by this
open communication. This brings more reinsurer interest to pooling, which
benefits the pools’ members through more reinsurance products and greater
competition.
C.

HAVE POOLS BECOME
REINSURERS’ INPUT?

MORE

ACCOMMODATING

TO

A third key finding was regarding whether pools have become
more accommodating to reinsurers in the last decade.164 The general answer
was yes. Again, the responses varied, but they leaned towards pools being
more accommodating or remaining equally accommodating in the past ten
years as the relationships between the two industries matured. There was a
true willingness of the pools to open up their operations, not based on just
the necessity to obtain reinsurance, but out of a sincere desire to have
reinsurers understand their operations and missions. This act of openness
163

E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc.,
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had recently been less accommodating to the wishes of the reinsurers—only that
accommodation had remained constant or increased.
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itself is an accommodation, although some officials did not perceive it as
such. However, the officials overall wanted their reinsurers to understand
they were not insurers, but risk management pools. Most participants felt a
sense of partnership with reinsurers, cultivated that relationship on a longterm basis and did not feel as though reinsurance was just another
commodity.
The senior official from the County Commissioners Association of
Pennsylvania answered:
Absolutely [pools are more accommodating]. I think a lot
of this is because there are so few [reinsurance] companies
to choose from.
Once you develop a long-term
relationship with a reinsurer, and they know your
processes, philosophy and people, you want to be able to
continue that relationship.
If you have to change
reinsurers, you know there will be a large investment of
time educating the new reinsurer and working out all the
kinks. This is not to say I would remain with a reinsurer if
they were overcharging me. Price is important but it is not
the be all and end all. We once changed our work comp
reinsurer because the pool board was attracted by the shiny
objects – a small savings in premium and a two year rate
guarantee – and we ended up going back to the reinsurer
we left because the shiny objects [reinsurer] did not
understand public entities.
[Reinsurer] input is definitely valuable. In pooling we sell
the added value of all the pool services, things our
members cannot get elsewhere. I expect the same added
value from our reinsurers. They provide speakers for our
training sessions for our members. They advise us on
coverage issues. It is much more than just giving us a
reinsurance certificate. And I also think this helps them
understand that we are serious about our business and want
to do a good job.165
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Again, we see the same discussion pattern about long-term relationships,
and the good faith activity it takes for both parties to get to that comfort
level and depth of understanding. But this pool expected some greater
accommodation from the reinsurer as well.
The senior official with the Montana School Board Group
Insurance Authority indicated for all the reasons he cited as to how
reinsurers did have influence, those were the same reasons that pools had
become more accommodating in the past ten years.166 As can been seen,
many of these concepts, and the responses to them, can be quite
interrelated.
The senior official for the Arizona School Risk Retention Trust,
Inc., indicated that the last ten years had not affected the level of
accommodation, but attributed that to long-term relationships:
In our case, I would not say we have had to become more
accommodating due to reinsurer’s input, unless the market
absolutely dictated a change was necessary, i.e. higher
pricing. The Trust has sought the opinions of our
reinsurers for many years because we value their input and
in most cases, it has proven to be helpful. With the recent
large liability losses our pool has experienced, we were
firm in our belief that our reserve numbers were more
accurate than what the reinsurers were suggesting. We
proved we were correct when the cases settled well below
the reinsurers’ reserve amounts. This is a factor of our
claims staff being more familiar with the local judicial
atmosphere and specifically, cases involving our industry
(education), than the reinsurers.
Our philosophy and actual demonstration of long-term
partnerships makes the Trust attractive to insurers, more so
than trying to accommodate reinsurers based on input they
provide on how we should operate. One of our reinsurance
partners has been with us for over twenty years.
We also believe that if a reinsurance carrier has paid out
more in losses than they have received from us in
166
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premium, we will do what we can to remain a partner with
that reinsurance carrier so that they are made whole over
time.
Conversely, due to the recent competitive
marketplace with several reinsurers vying for market share,
it puts the pool in a powerful position to not necessarily be
as accommodating to reinsurer’s input, if a particular
reinsurer is suggesting unrealistic terms and conditions or
rates.167
While there was no increased accommodation on his pool’s part, it is very
clear this was due to an ongoing and developed reinsurer relationship that
made further accommodation unnecessary for his pool. Note the
willingness to stay with a reinsurer if the reinsurer had sustained losses.
This willingness shows a great deal of accommodation—and one that the
pool hopes will come back to benefit them. Obviously, it took a great deal
of time and effort to get to that point.
Similarly, the senior official with the Maryland Association of
School Boards felt that the accommodation level had not increased or
decreased:
I do not think that we have become more accommodating
over the past 10 years. We have always tried to work
together with our reinsurance partners and continue to do
that.168
Again, there is a commitment from the pool over a period of years. While
this does not indicate an increase in accommodation, neither does it appear
there a decrease.
The senior official with the Idaho Counties Risk Management
Program, however, indicated there was no need to be more
accommodating:
We have found our reinsurers being much less demanding
than ten years ago so we don’t need to accommodate
much. I don’t know if this experience is true for other
167
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pools, however, the current reinsurance market seems
much less interested in understanding our operations than
10 years ago. I believe reinsurance underwriters today
focus more on loss experience and exposure data and less
on the personnel and perceived operational competence of
the pool than they did a decade ago. Evidence for this is
found in the decreasing frequency of personal meetings we
have with the markets and the lack of inquiry into anything
other than loss runs and exposure data.169
This official’s experience may be an anomaly, or may be that his
pool has run so well that the reinsurer feels no need for greater
involvement.
The former senior official with the Washington Schools Risk
Management Pool gives his view on accommodation to reinsurers,
regardless of their influence:
Pools more accommodating to reinsurers . . . I know we
haven’t. We left [our previous reinsurer] because they
started writing our competition. I told them to choose—us
or them, so they chose them and we did not renew. If
anything, our current reinsurer . . . has been
accommodating to us, seeking our input on head
concussion claims, asking what resources they can provide
to assist us, and taking part in our annual meetings . [As
to reinsurers writing our competition,] I view it as an arms
dealer who supplies both sides of the war. I do not want
my claims/underwriting information leaked out to the other
side and I don’t trust a vendor who doesn’t see a conflict. I
also want to maintain a competitive edge, so I want my
vendor to give me something the other [pool] can’t. The
question I’ve asked myself is, at what point does this
become meaningless—do I stop shopping at Wal-Mart just
because my competition shops there?170

169

E-mail from senior official, ICRMP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra
note 116.
170
E-mails from former senior official, Wash. Sch. Risk Mgmt. Pool, to
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 129.
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While this official feels that he has limited his accommodation to the point
of even terminating a reinsurance relationship, we will see later on that he
also strongly believes in the relationship, which may be why he ultimately
terminated his reinsurer.
The senior official with the Park District Risk Management
Agency did not feel that pools were more accommodating or less
accommodating in the last ten years, but felt there was a continued level of
accommodation. He stated:
I have only been actively involved in placing the
reinsurance for the past 8 years and I haven’t seen a
significant change in the time frame at PDRMA. I think
we have been relatively accommodating/receptive to the
reinsurers input and made changes suggested, both because
it is useful and because it makes us more attractive to the
reinsurers. Two specific examples: Three years ago we
undertook a significant project to identify all of the land,
including open undeveloped land, that our members
own/lease so that we could continue with the pollution
coverage we offer to the members. While the program is a
commercial insurance policy that we purchase on a group
basis with a high deductible, it is similar in concept to
reinsurers having influence on the data we collect. We
could have continued to procure the coverage without the
updated information, but there would have likely been
restrictions on the coverage.
Second example is when skate parks became popular in
our area about 8-10 years ago, the reinsurers were very
concerned that we were going to have large influx of
claims from those parks. They wanted specific data on
how many parks were in our membership and how the
risks were being controlled. The data was easy to collect
because we only had a few parks and our loss control staff
had been working with the members to develop risk
management guidelines so we had what the reinsurers
wanted. Fast forward 10 years, there are very few skate
park claims and none that have reached the reinsurance
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layers so this exposure has become a non-issue and the
reinsurers pay little attention to skate parks now.171
Here, the PDRMA took the necessary steps required for the reinsurance
underwriting, rather than make it a difficult issue for both parties. The
cooperation and transparency paid off for the pool in the end. Again, while
there is no mention of increased accommodation, it does not appear it has
lessened.
The senior official with the North Carolina School Boards
Association noted accommodation levels can vary based on circumstances.
She said:
I think pools are probably more accommodating of
reinsurers input, if they respect their reinsurer. I suppose
that in a circumstance where a pool may have no other
reinsurance option available, the accommodation of
reinsurer input is more out of necessity. Thankfully, that
has not been our situation over the last 10 years.172
This is another indication of reinsurer long-term relationships being
worthwhile for both parties.
A senior official with the Washington State Transit Insurance
Pool173 felt that, because of the growth of pooling, it was the reinsurers that
were more accommodating to the pools. He said:
It is more likely that the reinsurers’ have moved to
accommodate pooling than the other way around. More
than 80% of the public entity market is engaged in some
pooling relationship. I’m sure the commercial reinsurers
realize the significant market pooling is and they need to

171

E-mail from senior official, Park Dist. Risk Mgmt. Agency, to Assistant
Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 110.
172
E-mail from senior official, N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc., supra note 135.
173
The Washington State Transit Insurance Pool website is available at
http://www.wstip.org/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
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adjust to our process and mindset more than pooling to
theirs.174
This official’s perception, that reinsurers have become more
accommodating to pools, is likely true, based on the desire for greater
pooling market share discussed previously. However, this did not directly
answer if pools, regardless of the reinsurers’ positioning, have become
more accommodating as well—perhaps a meeting in the middle in this
case.
A senior official with the New Hampshire Public Risk
Management Exchange175 discussed less involvement by their reinsurer, but
noted their lengthy successful relationship underpinning the views of both
parties. This official stated:
Regarding influence, we have not had much involvement
by our reinsurer, with whom we have had a long-term
relationship. Our reinsurer is looking at our losses from a
different lens than we are. . . . [I] think we have had
favorable results with our reinsurer from a terms and
conditions standpoint, so the influence is minimal, other
than when there is a loss that reaches the reinsurance
layer. Then our concern is whether we can reach a
consensus on the claim with the reinsurer.176
Here, it appears the official feels the current need for accommodation has
not been at a high level due their favorable results over time.
The AGRiP senior officials, both current and former, had general
observations regarding pools being more accommodating in the past ten
years. The current senior official stated:
I can’t speak for all pools, but the ones I work with
certainly have. I believe pools are better served by
recognizing that there are partners out there—even for174

E-mail from senior official, Wash. State Transit Ins. Pool, to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc. (July 2, 2013, 10:39 AM CST) (on file with author).
175
The New Hampshire Public Risk Management Exchange website is
available at http://www.nhprimex.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
176
E-mail from senior official, N.H. Pub. Risk Mgmt. Exch., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc. (July 2, 11:26 AM CST) (on file with author).
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profit reinsurers!—who have expertise to share, along with
capital to “rent.” [As for those pools that have not been as
accommodating to reinsurers], I believe that some in the
pooling industry retain a distrust of for profit ‘vendors’ and
the insurance/reinsurance industry, in particular. They
have seen [reinsurers] run from the market, withhold claim
reimbursements, deny claims, even go under, and the [pool
executives] get cynical. Likewise, reinsurers have seen
some pools hit them with big claims and [drop their
reinsurance coverage] the next year, or [pools] be less than
forthcoming and timely with information. There are
always examples of bad business practices on both
reinsurer and pools’ parts. There are many more examples
of excellent, long term partnerships; they just don’t garner
as much attention.177
In other words, the individual cases of lack of faith are the ones that get
discussed, due to lawsuits and lingering bad feelings, but the ongoing and
symbiotic relationships do not warrant much discussion individually. She
continues:
Yes, I think the influence of all of the service
providers/partners vary by pool and individuals employed
by the pools and their willingness to engage with their
reinsurers as partners. One of the reasons AGRiP seeks to
educate pools is so that pools are on a more equal footing
with their service providers—reinsurers, actuaries,
auditors—because there is much “art” to managing risk
and risk financing, and when the pool and the subject
matter expert partner as ‘peers’ to solve problems, all are
better served. Some pool managers don’t share this
perspective; some reinsurance partners don’t embrace it.
But, in my experience, pool leaders have overall been
evolving toward a more collaborative operating model with
their reinsurers (and other partners), and this is a good
thing.178
177

E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc.,
supra note 120.
178
Id.
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This official notes the necessity for pools’ engagement of the reinsurers—
to gain a better understanding of the reinsurance process, and to use pool
cooperation as leverage for a better reinsurance product. While she
mentions being ‘peers,’ the act of engagement brings the influence of the
reinsurer to a greater level. Such an engagement, while done in the spirit of
partnership, appears to be concession to governance. This official has seen
why accommodations happen, and why they do not.
The former senior official of AGRiP opined about accommodation:
There does not seem to be as much of an adversarial
relationship between pool officials and reinsurers as in the
first 20 years of pooling. However, some pools have not
been as accommodating because they continue to have a
bad taste in their mouth due to fraudulent reinsurance
schemes they were placed in or because of reinsurer
insolvency. Both sides have matured and developed a
greater appreciation for their mutually dependent
relationships.
[Another reason some pools may not have been as
accommodating to reinsurers, and] I realize this is a broad
overstatement, but: it seems the greater the influence of
elected officials over a pool, the greater the pool considers
its importance and wants to operate like a big fish in a
small pond. In reality, all pools are small fish in big
ponds. The fewer elected officials involved, the more
rational the decision-making. But I never SAID this
[previously]; just theorized about it.179
This official notes why some pools (seemingly in the minority) have not
been as accommodating, and the reasons seem less than productive. It does
appear this official is pointing out both parties must enter into, and
continue, the relationship in good faith, act rationally based on their
respective positions, and follow through on their commitments.
The reinsurer underwriter with GEM, on recent pooling
accommodation, felt that pools continued to mature with the help of

179

E-mail from former senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc.,
supra note 122.
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reinsurers, although some continue to resist. Have pools become more
accommodating? The answer, from a reinsurer’s standpoint, was:
Yes. I have been actively involved in pooling for eight
years and when I first came within the industry, I was
amazed at the general naiveté of pools’ financial
acumen. Some pools were still community rated by nonactuarial practitioners. Some pools felt comfortable
reserving until their retention and no more. Some reserved
on a stair-stepping basis. These are all simplistic ways to
deal with risk transfer, but have become antiquated
practices of recent. I can’t say it was only reinsurer’s
influence, but more reinsurers took more pools seriously as
their operations become more palatable [to reinsurers].
Some pools remain unfazed (and even annoyed) at
reinsurer’s ‘suggestions.’ These fiercely independent
pools and pool leaders are clinging on to the purity of
pooling back 20-30 years ago. Fortunately for [those
particular] pool[s] and [their] members, 20 to 30 years of
success permit the incontrovertible argument against fixing
something that isn’t broken.180
Of course, the objective of regulation is to ensure solvency
(which can never be guaranteed, regardless of the level or
type of regulation), and these ‘pure’ pools are
solvent. They continue to serve their public entity
members in the best possible way. And, neither the added
cost of government controlled regulation, nor the
‘suggestions’ of the reinsurers, are changing the level of
risk the pool presents to the consumer.181

180

Of course, lucky is not an excuse for a lack of objectivity and business
prudence. As F. Scott Fitzgerald said, “Nothing is as obnoxious as other people’s
luck.” Peggy Hayes, Letters to Scottie, Letters to Us, THE MISCELLANY NEWS, Oct.
2, 1981, at 6.
181
E-mail from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc., supra note 149.
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This reinsurer seems to feel that the basis for greater accommodation by
pools is, through maturation, a greater appreciation by the pools of those
benefits the reinsurer can bring.
From the input of the participants documented here, there is
general agreement that accommodations do exist, even if there is some
dispute about whether it is increasing or not. As the GEM underwriter
previously pointed out, reinsurers need to be careful as to the approaches
taken pursuing this influence and the desire for pool accommodation, since
this market is getting more competitive for reinsurers. It does seem that
accommodations appear to be a form of voluntarily accepted reinsurer
governance.
D.

DOES REINSURER INFLUENCE
EXTERNAL FACTORS?

VARY

ACCORDING

TO

Lastly, the evidence showed that reinsurer influence with pools
varies, as seen in some of the responses. Financial strength and pool
sophistication, two elements often intertwined, were the two greatest
factors that determined the level of reinsurer involvement. Did these
officials believe reinsurer influence varied based on factors such as
financial size or condition, perceived sophistication or experience of the
pool administrators, or any other factors? Again, the answers diverged
somewhat, but seemed to come back to financial strength of the pool as
being the most specific factor. Nevertheless, more interesting was the
officials’ insistence on speaking to the relationship as the intangible factor
that might be the most determinative of all in the debate regarding
governance.
First, the senior official with the Texas Association of School
Boards, Inc., stated:
I think the influence of the reinsurers varies greatly based
on the financial condition, size, age, ‘sophistication’ and
experience of the pool. The smaller, younger, financially
weak or more outsourced a pool is, the greater the
perceived risk for the reinsurer and the greater their
involvement and imposition of certain requirements. For
example, I can’t remember the last time a reinsurer
imposed or even reviewed . . . who [the TASB Risk
Management Fund] can write and at what price. That’s
because we are very well established, have a proven track
record and assume a large retention on every risk. So they
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tend to leave us alone. However, if we were new, had an
unproven track record, weren’t as financially solid, the
picture would be very different. The reinsurers would
impose much greater underwriting and claims oversight
than they do for us.182
Finances appear to be the pivotal factor as to reinsurer governance, and
influence seems to vary based on the relative strength of the pool. Because
this pool is very substantial in comparison to its exposures, the reinsurers
have fewer concerns or need for influence.
The former senior official with the Washington Schools Risk
Management Pool felt that excellent financial condition of the pool
lessened influence of the reinsurers:
Influence based on size . . . absolutely; with us selfinsuring the first $1 million and having the surplus to take
more if necessary, I think we have more options and
flexibility than a small pool with limited surplus and small
retention. I think the Texas Association of School Boards
has even greater clout with the reinsurance market.183
It appears again that, regardless of the perception of reinsurer influence,
reinsurers are much more willing to follow the fortunes of a well-managed,
financially strong pool using less reinsurer influence.
The senior official with the Maryland Association of Boards of
Education had similar sentiments about financial strength, but also
sophistication of the administration:
[The] reinsurer would have a lot more confidence dealing
with property from a pool that has accurate property values
vs. a pool that can only estimate its property values.184 And
a reinsurer is obviously concerned about a pool’s
182

E-mail from senior official, TASB. Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc.,
supra note 105.
183
E-mail from senior official, Wash. Sch. Risk Mgmt. Pool, to Assistant.
Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 129.
184
As the senior official with the Missouri Housing Authorities Property &
Casualty, Inc. discovered, and corrected. E-mail from senior official, Mo. Hous.
Auths. Prop. & Cas., Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 101.
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finances. They obviously would rather write strong wellfunded pools than those with inadequate reserves and/or
surplus. I spoke with one of our reinsurers who advised
me that our program secured great comparative rates
because they trusted our submissions knowing our
representations of data, claims and resources were accurate
and our financial position was strong.185
Again, finances, along with trust of the pool’s representations, lessened the
amount of reinsurance governance necessary. Reinsurers have a larger
degree of faith and certainty in pools operating at a high level. This trust
comes from the pool’s transparency.
The senior official for the Arizona Risk Retention Trust, Inc., said
that the factors leading to a well-established pool lessened the influence of
the reinsurer:
Yes, the less mature pools may feel they are inexperienced
and look to the reinsurer for guidance and advice. The less
mature pools may also be less attractive to the reinsurers
because of the lack of stability and the financial strength of
a more mature pool. The more mature pools may be less
influenced by the reinsurer, but may have strong working
relationships with them which help keep the pool strong
and attractive to other [re]insurers.186
This is another example of the inverse relationship between pool strength
and reinsurance governance. The stronger the pool, the less the reinsurer is
able, or needs to, influence the pool.
The senior official with the Montana School Group Insurance
Authority continued on the same theme of reinsurance influence waning as
the pools financial strength grew. Can reinsurer influence vary?
Yes again. Size does matter with regard to the primary
pool level. The large pools usually have greater depth and
put more primary pool effort into the reinsurance
185

E-mail from senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 114.
186
E-mail from senior official, Ashton Tiffany, LLC, to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc., supra note 112.
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submission process. While smaller pools rely to a greater
extent on the assistance provide by the insurance
placement brokerage firm staff for the best items to include
[as well as] how to organize the information for the
reinsurance carrier. Many brokers will actually ‘pretty up’
the raw data from the smaller primary pool and provide a
more organized package or submission for the reinsurance
carrier on behalf of their [small pool] client.
[However], the larger pools often . . . need access to certain
reinsurance markets because of specialty risks they need to
insure such as Tier 1 wind,187 Flood zone A188 & V,189 or
just the raw size of their program limit needed. Thus, not
just any reinsurance carrier is going to do, so the
[reinsurance] influence, although still indirect, is more
present than ever given the factor of primary pool size.190
This official points out an interesting diminishing returns dilemma for
successful pools. If a pool is successful and needs a reinsurer willing to
reinsure large amounts, or a pool specializes in a niche market (which
many governmental entity pools inherently must), the market for
reinsurance products actually decreases. This can result in the increased
influence of the remaining reinsurers on such pools; a greater level of
governance because of the increased or unusual exposures and limited
selection of reinsurers.

187

Those coastal areas are prone to windstorms and hurricanes, thus
specialized coverage is needed. For example, in Texas these coastal areas are listed
in TEX. INS. CODE § 2210.003(4) (West 2009).
188
Areas subject to inundation by the one-percent-annual-chance flood event
generally determined using approximate methodologies. Zone A, FED. EMERGENCY
MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/floodplain-management/zone#0 (last
visited Dec, 27, 2014).
189
Areas along coasts subject to inundation by the one-percent-annual-chance
of flood event with additional hazards associated with storm-induced waves. Zone
V, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/national-floodinsurance-program-2/zone-v#0 (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
190
E-mail from senior official, Mont. Sch. Grp. Ins. Auth., to Assistant. Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 132.
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The senior official with the Idaho Counties Risk Management
Program felt that while reinsurers do exert more or less influence based on
varying pool factors, other external factors played a role as well:
I do believe reinsurers are influenced [by financial size or
condition, perceived sophistication or experience of the
pool administrators].
However, reinsurance markets
continue to be driven by financial modeling and national
and international corporate strategy rather than by personal
perception of individual pools. Allianz191 provided a large
and popular property market for pools until three years
ago. ICRMP had been a client for 10 years and was
extremely profitable. Allianz’s corporate strategy was to
exit the public entity market place and resulted in a large
number of pools changing property markets. Allianz’s
decision is an example of a global corporation’s market
strategy taking precedent over the local underwriter’s
impressions of an individual pool.192
This official’s experience was that the pooling market was still not large
enough to make an overall impression on large reinsurers. However, it
appears other reinsurers are taking their place, as the GEM reinsurer
underwriter indicated.
The senior official with the County Commissioners Association of
Pennsylvania took a more relationship-centric view to the question
regarding various factors affecting influence, and this became a trend in the
responses:
I think it [is] more about the philosophy of the
management of the pool. This includes the [pool’s] board
but I would say it is as much about the pool’s staff. If the
pool’s staff believes reinsurance is just a mere commodity,
then the relationship will be very different and can even be
combative. If the relationship is collaborative, even a
rough claims issue can be resolved. We did have one bad
191

See generally Property Insurance, ALLIANZ GLOBAL CORP. & SPECIALTY,
http://www.agcs.allianz.com/services/property/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
192
E-mail from senior official, ICRMP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra
note 116.
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situation with a reinsurer who abandoned us because of our
[then] financial condition (which is much stronger now).
They were new to our pool and did not want to invest the
time to see if we would turn the finances around.193
Notice the term “commodity” arose, as a definite negative to a pool. It is
apparent to this official that the more reinsurance is a commodity for a
pool, for whatever reason, the less beneficial the relationship is for the
pool, and the less good faith is shown by all.
The senior official with the Park District Risk Management
Agency noted:
I do think perceived sophistication/experience
financial conditions can influence a reinsurers’ view
specific pool.
The reinsurers regularly review
financials as part of the annual renewal process and
want to know details about any changes. A pool
significantly under prices exposures for the members
create additional risks for the reinsurers.194

and
of a
our
they
that
may

In other words, if a reinsurer believes a pool is underpricing its coverage,
the reinsurer will charge higher premiums or may walk away altogether.
Under-pricing exposures is very detrimental to the creation and
maintenance of an atmosphere of utmost good faith, and makes it
extremely difficult for a reinsurer to willingly follow the fortunes of the
pool. More sophisticated pools are better able to price their exposures
accurately.
The former senior official of AGRiP had comments that are more
general:
Yes, just as with other insurers or in any other business
relationship where there are degrees of separation between
“size, perceived sophistication [and] experience, financial
condition or other factors” between the parties. But
reinsurers, as a general proposition, are seeking long-term
193

E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 107.
194
E-mail from senior official, Park Dist. Risk Mgmt. Agency, to Assistant
Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 110.
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financial success, not just one profitable year at the
expense of their clients.195
This official notes that while all of those factors are important, the
reinsurers generally do not want a one-term relationship. It appears this is
much like gambling—reinsurers have to win over time; otherwise, they are
dependent upon quick strike luck at pools’ expense, and will soon run out
of willing clients. The relationship aspect matters most, regardless of what
factors drive it and how much governance is necessary.
The underwriter from the reinsurer GEM had this to say—and note
his use of the term ‘symbiotic relationships,’ which is mentioned
unprompted more than once by various pooling officials:
GEM is in a unique position on this, since we are owned
by pools. Our best interest is our pools best interest, and
vice versa. I think a reinsurer’s influence does vary,
somewhat based on the items you list, but also based on
the reinsured’s acceptance of “advice.”
Because
reinsurance as a regulator is de facto at best, without legal
authority or mandatory regulations, the reinsured needs to
both accept and value the suggestions made by the
reinsurer. This type of trust is built either by mutual
interested (such as with GEM), or long-term symbiotic
relationships (as with other commercial reinsurers).196
This reinsurance underwriter encapsulates much of the theory of this
paper—the cedent has no statutory obligation but willingly accepts
operational governing parameters to obtain a product. This governance is
best appreciated and grown through long-term symbiotic relationships.
The senior official with the Washington State Transit Insurance
Pool continued the symbiotic theme, mentioning the need for these solid
relationships, regardless of his feelings on influence:
The questions on the relationship of a reinsurer to the
conduct of our pool are mutual. Before we would even
195

E-mail from former senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB., Inc.
(July 11, 2013, 12:07 PM).
196
E-mail from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc., supra note 149.
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entertain the prospect of any engagement we’d make sure
they know our business, they are comfortable with our best
practices and claims handling and final they share our long
term vision.
Pooling as a whole is finally beginning to ideologically
move from the mindset of a ‘country-club attitude’ to a
small mutual insurance enterprise. Pools relationship to
the mutual insurance world is no different than a credit
union is to being a bank.
Our business is one of relationships. Pools need to foster a
cohesive, professional and mutual understanding with their
respective partners including reinsurers, captives and
excess markets.197
This is another relationship-centric focused comment that indicates the
governance is beyond any one factor of reinsurer influence.
The senior official with the New Hampshire Public Risk
Management Exchange emphasized reinsurer relationships as well:
As to the relationship between reinsurers and pools, it is
critical. It is critical for the reinsurer to know the pool is
proactive in risk management and claims mitigation, and
that the pool has the appropriate expertise on staff to deal
with that. I think there is work by the claim staff that can
be done to keep the loss from ever getting into the
reinsurance layer, so staff expertise and skill level is
important to reinsurers. From the pool’s perspective, it is
vital the reinsurer understands the unique nature of public
entity pooling and the unique exposures that come with
that. The relationship has to be symbiotic, as this is
important to enable both parties to succeed.198

197

E-mail from senior official, Wash. State Transit Ins. Pool, to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 174.
198
E-mail from senior official, N.H. Pub. Risk Mgmt. Exch., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 176.
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There is striking continuity in this relationship theme. This official feels
that symbiosis is critical for success.
The senior official with the North Carolina School Boards
Association felt strongly as well about the relationship aspect:
I think it is helpful to have the reinsurer as a resource of
information and to use as a guide in deciding which
direction a pool might go with certain programs, if the pool
respects the reinsurer and its staff. For example, this year
we engaged our reinsurer in discussions about how our
pool planned to address the issue of law enforcement
liability coverage for our members. Of course, a topic such
as this has direct implications on the reinsurer, depending
on how the coverage is written, and having them involved
in the discussion from the beginning was good for
everyone. If the mutual respect/positive relationship does
not exist between the reinsurer and the pool, then it is
difficult to move forward as a team in planning which way
a pool program may decide to go.199
The senior official with the Missouri Housing Authorities Property
and Casualty, Inc., echoed the same sentiments about the pool-reinsurer
relationship:
The pool-reinsurer relationship is a valuable and necessary
partnership.
I believe that good and timely
communication, together with consistency in the handling
of claims is key to negotiating the optimal arrangement for
future years. Relationships matter a lot.200
The current senior official with AGRIP felt that reinsurers gaining
a greater understanding of pooling was a key factor—but it often depended
on the underwriters:

199

E-mail from senior official, N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, to Assistant Dir., TASB,
Inc., supra note 135.
200
E-mail from senior official, Mo. Hous. Auths. Prop. & Cas., Inc., to
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 101.
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It depends on the individual [underwriter], more than the
reinsurance company. Some individual underwriters at
reinsurers that have developed a real understanding of
pools with tell you they truly prefer pool partners than
other insurance companies. They embrace the missiondriven risk control purpose. They appreciate the stability
of the pool’s book of business. But underwriters with no
such experience really don’t know there is a difference. I
don’t mean to sound philosophical, but I truly believe that
pooling, done right, is a different animal—a different
paradigm—than insurance. There are underwriters that
specialize in pools at a variety of reinsurers who ‘get this’,
and sell [their] senior management on this [concept]. But,
that doesn’t mean the reinsurance company as a whole
prefers pools to insurers; they are just two separate client
groups.201
Much like the operation of GEM, which is a reinsurer owned by its
member pools, the senior official with the County Commissioners
Association of Pennsylvania mentioned his own captive reinsurer,202 a
system that creates and encourages the long-standing relationships:
We are members of one of our reinsurers – County
Reinsurance Limited (CRL). Two of our pools work with
CRL for coverage (work comp and liability). CRL is a
Vermont based captive owned by the county pools, which
are reinsured by it. This is the next step in pooling,
gaining greater control and specificity of knowledge about
our exposures. This is working exceedingly well for us.203

201

E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc.,
supra note 120.
202
See generally Donald J. Riggin, Things to Know about Captive Insurance
RISK
MGMT.
INST.
(Nov.
2008),
Companies,
INT’L
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2008/riggin11-risk-finance-captives.aspx.
203
E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 107.
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While the senior official with the Maryland Association of School
Boards previously mentioned he did not feel there was much in the way of
influence by reinsurers, he felt the relationship aspect was necessary:
[F]or us, working with reinsurers is just like working with
other vendors. Trust, transparency and diligence go a long
way to creating a positive mutually beneficial
relationship.204
The senior official with the New Hampshire Public Risk
Management Exchange probably capped this discussion most succinctly:
We need reinsurance. We need that level of protection. Its
whether or not the reinsurers will see the opportunity, with
what is happening in the market, to stay competitive with
small to medium sized risks, like pools.205
Towards the end in this last sub-Part, the officials’ thoughts were
left without this author’s comment, as they seemed to speak for themselves.
As can be seen, even though the question presented to the officials involved
factors that might vary influence (and thus governance), most redirected
back to, and passionately argued for, the need for symbiotic relationships
over the long-term. Without these close relationships, it appears, reinsurers
would have no influence (other than purely contractual) for governance to
protect their exposures, and pools would have little incentive to
accommodate the reinsurers.
V.

CONCLUSION

Based on this research, it seems clear there is a form of reinsurance
influence or ‘governance,’ in the largely unregulated world of self-insured
pools, and it seems to manifest itself mostly in underwriting and claim
reinsurer influence. Rather than state regulation, which takes the all too
familiar form of statutes, administrative regulations, and litigation, this
‘governance’ imposed by reinsurers is centered on relationships and the
204

E-mail from senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 114.
205
E-mail from senior official, N.H. Pub. Risk Mgmt. Exch., to Assistant Dir.,
TASB, Inc., supra note 176.
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business needs of both parties. Pools are free to unburden themselves from
any oversight or influence by reinsurers, and reinsurers are free to not
accept pools’ risks. Nevertheless, in both doing so, pools lose the
opportunity to rent capital to expand their market share or limit risk, and
reinsurers lose premium dollars and their own market share.
While some pools feel reinsurers have no real impact, and perhaps
some reinsurers might feel they have great control, the reality for both lies
more towards the middle. Depending on the pool, the advantage is more
likely towards the reinsurer, or, when dealing with experienced and wellfunded pools, perhaps more towards equilibrium. Reinsurers currently do
not conduct business with pools with a stick, but a carrot—the promise of
lower rates and/or more favorable terms if the pools concede to certain
reinsurer input or improve transparency. Thus, as many above have put it,
the reinsurer is essentially given influence on the process by the pools. All
pools want lower reinsurance rates to help lower the overall cost to their
members. In order to obtain this benefit, the pools willingly accept
reinsurer’s governance to gain the advantages possible in the relationship.
Moreover, by pools giving this influence to their long-term partner
reinsurers, this author argues the governance effect is not necessarily
‘silent’ as Professor Abramovsky labels it, at least in the pooling segment,
but an open and recognized influence. Because this concept of ‘agreedupon governance’ between cedents and reinsurers is a fairly new one, or at
least not well documented, it may be that more pools and reinsurers will
have different perspectives on the relationship as time goes on. Even the
term ‘influence’ seems to mean different things to these diverse entities.
What one pool views as ordinary underwriting requests by reinsurers might
be viewed by another pool as overreaching and burdensome, much in the
way some people have varying views of taxation.
However, it appears from this research there is a reinsurer
‘governance effect’ on pools in this relationship. Since the behavior of the
pool changes based on the relationship, the degree of adjustment does not
matter for the effect to cross the line into apparent governance, however
mild. While there may be a contractual agreement in place among the
parties, that cannot change the fact that, if reinsurance was always available
and at a set price, pools would likely not alter their behavior, unless forced
to do so by other internal or market conditions. Since the majority of
pooling officials noted underwriting and claims accommodations, it
certainly appears they agree that a form of governance is present, whether
they wish to characterize it that way themselves or not.
Therefore, even if pools would prefer not to call it ‘regulation’ as it
makes them think of state administrative regulation and all its negative
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implications, this governance effect, even if very subtle compared to state
regulation, is there. Reinsurers do shape the approach, to varying degrees, of
how most pools operate.
This reinsurance influence does not have to be antagonistic, and as
most survey participants agreed, is not. As the pooling officials admitted,
they willingly agreed on some issues or bore the expense of more
transparency since it helped them run a better business and gain the financial
and marketing advantages of reinsurance. The opportunity of reinsurance
gives the pools the flexibility to write new markets or expand current ones,
limit risk and gain market knowledge—opportunities that might not have
otherwise arisen had the pool not engaged in the reinsurance process.
The more interesting finding was the utmost good faith aspect that
almost seemed inherent with this segment of the market. While other
sectors of reinsurance may indeed be moving away from this concept and
focusing on arms-length transactions, pooling seems to be going the
opposite direction by embracing the relationship. From this admittedly
small sample of the approximately 500 pools currently operating in the
United States, it appears that, rather than becoming a commodity to each
other, reinsurers and pools are engaging the strengths of each and forging
long-term business bonds.
This adherence to the concept of utmost good faith through symbiotic
relationships appears to arise inherently here, and, to this author, is the more
important finding. This research did not set out to show whether utmost good
faith was still abundant; however, the discovery of this is a satisfying
underpinning to the main point of reinsurer influence. Does reinsurer
governance arise because the concept of utmost good faith is adhered to by
the pools, or does inherent reinsurer influence force the concept of utmost
good faith onto the pools? In the end, it is neither. Pools allow the reinsurer
to have influence to the extent necessary in order to obtain the best product
and service possible for their members, and pools embrace utmost good faith
because it is the most efficient route to that end in the long term.
Based on this research, these industry professionals outline the
influence of reinsurers on pools, and the governance that arises from this
influence. This regulatory influence, hypothesized by Professor Abramovsky,
is demonstrated by this research. This reinsurer governance, whether
characterized as direct or indirect, or regulatory or not in nature, is governance
(‘sway’, as the governance definition also called it) accepted by the pools.
This acceptance, shown in the form of utmost good faith by the pools, results
in utmost good faith being returned by the reinsurers. These interdependent
experiences strengthen the relationship, and the prospects, for both cedent and
reinsurer, and are possible because of reinsurer governance.
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APPENDICES
A.

INITIAL QUESTIONS TO POOL OFFICIALS

1.
Do you think pools are influenced by reinsurers? If so,
does this influence get into operational level matters affecting employees
conduct, such as reinsurer suggestions on claim procedures, coverage issue
handling, or authority—can you give any specific examples? If it is
general influence rather than specific, such as what coverages to offer or
underwriting criteria, can you give examples of that?
2.
Do you think pools have become more accommodating in
the past 10 years to reinsurers’ input, either because the input is helpful or
because it is necessary to make the pool more attractive to insurers? Or for
any other reason?
3.
Do you think reinsurers’ influence on individual pools can
vary based on factors such as the size of the pool, perceived
sophistication/experience, financial condition or other factors?
4.
Any other comments about the pool—reinsurer
relationship from your experience?
B.

INITIAL QUESTIONS TO AGRIP OFFICIALS

Assuming that reinsurance is a vital component of most pools’
financial viability:
1.
Do you believe pools have practices or operational
procedures in place as a result of suggestions or requirements from
reinsurers? Or, in other words, do you think pools believe they are directly
or indirectly “regulated” in a fashion or largely influenced by their
reinsurers’ underwriting and examination of their operations?
2.
If not, do you think pools believe their inherent financial
viability requires them to focus on internal procedures (or to self-regulate
without insurance department oversight), or is it more about their fiduciary
and contractual obligations to members, rather than the influence of
reinsurance? Or is it another reason?
3.
As to the type of reinsurance typically taken out by pools,
do you see most pools taking out treaty reinsurance or facultative
reinsurance? More importantly, do you think most pools take out excess of
loss reinsurance versus proportional reinsurance? I have a feeling pools are
generally like the TASB Fund, with treaty reinsurance/excess of loss
reinsurance.
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4.
I am very interested in your thoughts into those examples
of pools attempting to be more attractive to reinsurers, and the subtle
influence of reinsurers suggestions, regarding loss control requirements,
claim management procedures and coverage issues. Specifically, I am
interested in how reinsurers input affects the actual conduct of pool/TPA
personnel. I am trying to nail down if reinsurers give general input, or does
it tend to be more specific on the operational level? Additionally, what
kinds of examples have you seen as it relates to claim management or
coverage issues? Did reinsurers make suggestions generally about claim
management focus, or was it more specific as to daily operations, structure,
caseloads, or authority? As to coverage, were the suggestions more general
in nature, such as types of coverage offered, or more specific/operational,
such as suggestions on coverage question investigations or coverage
decisions? Any examples of reinsurer influence you can give me that
affect a large number of pools would be helpful.
5.
Do you feel that pools have generally become more
accommodating in the past decade to reinsurers input, either because the
input is helpful or because of the attempt to make the pool attractive to
reinsurers?
6.
For any pools that have not been as accommodating, do
you have any thoughts as to why, and do you think these pools are limiting
their ability to grow (with the lack of capacity/capital)?
7.
Do you think reinsurers currently feel more of a
partnership with pools versus insurers, or is it just different?
C.

QUESTIONS TO REINSURANCE UNDERWRITER

1.
Do you believe pools have practices or operational
procedures in place as a result of suggestions or requirements from
reinsurers? Or, in other words, do you think pools are directly or indirectly
“regulated” in a fashion or largely influenced by their reinsurers’
underwriting and examination of their operations?
2.
Do reinsurers believe they directly or indirectly regulate or
largely influence pools’ behavior through underwriting and operations
reviews, more so than standard primary carriers?
3.
If so, do reinsurers believe this influence is necessary
because of the limited regulation or unregulated nature of pools? And is it
more about pools’ financial stability or operational ability, or other factors?
4.
If not, do reinsurers just feel pools are a risk like any other
carrier, with inherent strengths and weaknesses?
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5.
Overall, do reinsurers support pools’ efforts to remain
outside of governmental regulation, and why?
6.
As to the type of reinsurance typically taken out by pools,
do you see most pools taking out treaty reinsurance or facultative
reinsurance? More importantly, do you think most pools take out excessof-loss reinsurance versus proportional reinsurance? I have a feeling pools
are generally like the TASB Fund, with treaty reinsurance/excess of loss
reinsurance.
7.
I am very interested in your thoughts into those examples
of indirect influence on pools by reinsurers’ suggestions. Some areas of
influence might be loss control requirements, claim management
procedures and coverage offerings/issues. Specifically, I am interested in
how reinsurers input affects the actual conduct of pool/TPA personnel. I
am trying to nail down if reinsurers give general input, or does it tend to be
more specific on the operational level? Can you give me examples of how
reinsurers have tried to affect pools’ behavior? Any examples of influence
that affects the majority of pools would be helpful.
8.
Do you feel that pools have generally become more
accommodating in the past decade to reinsurers input, either because the
input is helpful or because of the attempt to make the pool attractive to
reinsurers?
9.
For any pools that have not been as accommodating, do
you have any thoughts as to why, and do you think these pools are limiting
their ability to grow (with the lack of capacity/capital)? Or less
accommodating because reinsurers are more interested lately in the public
entity pooling market, and pools don’t have to work as hard to find
reinsurance?
10.
As reinsurers gain a greater understanding of pools—
reduction of risk versus underwriting profit—do you think reinsurers
currently feel more of a partnership with pools versus insurers, or is it just
different?
11.
Why do you believe there has been renewed interest by
reinsurers in writing pools?
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SAMPLE INTERLOCAL PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT

TASB RISK MANAGEMENT FUND
INTERLOCAL PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT
Pursuant to the Texas Interlocal Cooperation Act, Chapter 791 of the
Texas Government Code, this Interlocal Participation Agreement
(Agreement) is entered into by and between the Texas Association of
School Boards Risk Management Fund (Fund) and the undersigned
local government of the State of Texas (Fund Member). The Fund is
an administrative agency of local governments (Fund Members) that
cooperate in performing administrative services and governmental
functions relative to risk management.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
In consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions contained in
this Agreement and other good and valuable consideration,
including, without limitation, the agreement of the Fund and Fund
Members to provide risk management programs as detailed in this
Agreement, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, Fund Member and the Fund, intending to be legally
bound, and subject to the terms, conditions, and provisions of this
Agreement, agree as follows:
1.

Authority. Fund Member hereby approves and adopts the
Restatement of Interlocal Agreement, dated May 20, 1997,
which restated the Interlocal Agreement dated July 2, 1974,
establishing the predecessor of the Fund. The Restatement of
Interlocal Agreement is incorporated into this Agreement by
reference and is available from the Fund upon request. This
Agreement serves to outline the relationship between the Fund
and Fund Member. While the Texas Interlocal Cooperation Act
provides the overarching basis for the Fund, certain Fund
programs are further authorized pursuant to various statutes,
such as Chapter 205 of the Texas Labor Code, pertaining to
unemployment compensation; Chapter 504 of the Texas Labor
Code, pertaining to workers’ compensation; and Chapter 2259,
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Subchapter B, of the Texas Government Code, pertaining to
other risks or hazards.
2.

Program Participation. This Agreement enables Fund
Member to participate in one or more of the Fund’s available
programs, including but not limited to, property, liability, auto,
workers’ compensation, and unemployment compensation
coverage. Because this is an enabling Agreement, Fund
Member must also execute a separate Contribution and
Coverage Summary (CCS) for each Fund program from which
it seeks coverage and/or administrative services. Only a valid
CCS will confer the right to participate in a specific program
and each CCS shall be incorporated into this Agreement.
Through participation in any Fund program, Fund Member
waives none of its immunities and authorizes the Fund, or its
designee, to assert such immunities on its behalf and on behalf
of the Fund or its designee.

3.

Term of Agreement. This Agreement shall be effective from
the date of the last signature below and shall remain in effect
unless terminated as provided in this Agreement. This
Agreement will automatically terminate if Fund Member
ceases to participate in at least one of the Fund’s programs (due
to the expiration of a CCS participation term or the valid
termination of same) or fails to meet the membership
qualifications of the Fund as provided in this Agreement and as
determined by the Fund in writing.

4.

Termination. Unless this Agreement is automatically
terminated as described above, this Agreement, and/or any
component CCS applicable to Fund Member, can be terminated
as set forth below. However, the termination of any single Fund
program under a CCS shall not also result in the automatic
termination of another pending CCS, or this enabling
Agreement if any other CCS is still in force for Fund Member.
Rather, each Fund program can only be terminated as provided
in this Agreement.
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a.

By Either Party with 30 Days Notice before Renewal.
Any CCS may be terminated by either party with
termination to be effective on any successive renewal
date by giving written notice to the other party no later
than 30 days prior to automatic renewal.

b.

By Fund Member upon Payment of Late Notice Fee. If
Fund Member fails to terminate a CCS as provided
above, it may still terminate participation in any Fund
program prior to the renewal date by paying a late notice
fee as herein provided. If Fund Member terminates the
CCS before the renewal date, but with fewer than 30
days’ advance written notice, Fund Member agrees to pay
the Fund a late notice fee in the amount of 25% of the
annual contribution for the expiring participation term.
Fund Member expressly acknowledges that the late notice
fee is not a penalty, but a reasonable approximation of the
Fund’s damages for the Fund Member’s untimely
withdrawal from the program identified in the CCS.
However, once the renewal term of a CCS commences,
Fund Member can no longer terminate the CCS by paying
a late notice fee; the CCS shall renew and Fund Member
shall be bound thereby.

c.

By the Fund upon Breach by Fund Member.
1) The Fund may terminate this Agreement or any CCS
based on breach of any of the following obligations,
by giving 10 days’ written notice to Fund Member of
the breach; and Fund Member’s failure to cure the
breach within said 10 days (or other time period
allowed by the Fund):
2) Fund Member fails or refuses to make the payments
or contributions required by this Agreement;
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3) Fund Member fails to cooperate and comply with any
reasonable requests for information and/or records
made by the Fund;
4) Fund Member fails or refuses to follow loss
prevention or statutory compliance requirements of
the Fund, as provided in this Agreement; or
5) Fund Member otherwise breaches this Agreement.
If the Fund terminates this Agreement, or any CCS, based on
breach as described above, Fund Member agrees that the Fund
will have no responsibility of any kind or nature to provide
coverage on the terminated Fund program post-termination.
Further, Fund Member shall bear the full financial responsibility
for any unpaid open claim and expense related to any claim,
asserted or unasserted and reported or unreported, against the
Fund or Fund Member, or incurred by the agents or
representatives of Fund Member.
In addition to the foregoing, if termination is due to Fund
Member’s failure to make required payments or contributions,
Fund Member agrees that it shall pay the Fund liquidated
damages in the amount of 50% of the annual contribution for the
participation term identified in the terminated CCS.
5. Contributions.
a.

Agreement to Pay. Fund Member agrees to pay its
contribution for each Fund program in which it
participates based on a plan developed by the Fund. The
amount of contribution will be stated in the relevant CCS
and will be payable upon receipt of an invoice from the
Fund. Late fees amounting to the maximum interest
allowed by law, but not less than the rate of interest
authorized under Chapter 2251, Texas Government Code,
shall begin to accrue daily on the first day following the
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due date and continue until the contribution and late fees
are paid in full. If Fund Member owes the Fund payments
under this Agreement, including any CCS, the Fund may
offset such amounts from any Fund Member funds held
by the Fund, regardless of program.
b.

Estimated Contribution. In specified situations, the
amount of contribution shown in the CCS will be
identified as an estimate. The Fund reserves the right to
request an audit of updated exposure information at the
end of the CCS participation term and adjust
contributions if Fund Member’s exposure changes during
the CCS participation term. As a result of the exposure
review, any additional contribution payable to the Fund
shall be paid by Fund Member, and any overpayment of
contribution by Fund Member shall be returned by the
Fund. The Fund reserves the right to audit the relevant
records of Fund Member in order to conduct this
exposure review.
Upon expiration of each participation period, Fund
Member may request a contribution adjustment due to
exposure changes. Such request must be made in writing
within 60 days after the end of the participation period.
Fund Member must provide documentation as requested
by the Fund to demonstrate that the exposure change
warrants a contribution adjustment.

c.

Contribution Adjustment. Should the Fund’s
underwriting income for any program within a given
program year be inadequate to pay the ultimate cost of
claims incurred for that year, the Fund may collect an
adjusted contribution from any current or former Fund
Member if that Fund Member’s contribution is
inadequate to pay the Fund Member’s claims incurred
during that year.
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6.

Contribution and Coverage Summary. Fund Member agrees
to abide by each CCS that governs its participation. A CCS will
incorporate the program specific coverage document, if any,
which sets forth the scope of coverage and/or services from the
Fund. A CCS for a Fund program will state the participation
term. After Fund Member’s initial execution of a CCS, the
CCS will automatically renew annually, unless terminated in
accordance with this Agreement. Any renewal containing a
change in the amount of contribution or other terms will be
subject to the Amendment by Notice process described in this
Agreement.

7.

Loss Prevention. The Fund may provide loss prevention
services to Fund Member. Fund Member agrees to adopt the
Fund’s reasonable and customary standards for loss prevention
and to cooperate in implementing any and all reasonable loss
prevention and statutory compliance recommendations or
requirements.

8.

Other Duties of Fund Member.
a.

Standards of Performance. Time shall be of the essence
in Fund Member’s reporting of any and all claims to the
Fund, payment of any contributions or monies due to the
Fund, and delivery of any written notices under this
Agreement.

b.

Claims Reporting. Notice of any claim must be provided
to the Fund no more than 30 days after Fund Member
knows or should have known of the claim or
circumstances leading to the claim, unless a different
reporting requirement is required by law or provided for
in the CCS. Failure by Fund Member to timely report a
claim may result in denial of coverage or payment of
fines or penalties imposed by law or regulatory agencies.
If the Fund advances payment of any fine or penalty
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arising from Fund Member’s late claim reporting, Fund
Member will reimburse the Fund for all such costs.
9.

Administration of Claims. The Fund or its designee agrees to
administer all claims for which Fund Member has coverage
after Fund Member provides timely written notice to the Fund.
Fund Member hereby authorizes the Fund or its designee to act
in all matters pertaining to handling of claims for which Fund
Member has coverage pursuant to this Agreement. Fund
Member expressly agrees that the Fund has sole authority in all
matters pertaining to the administration of claims and grants
the Fund or its designee full decision-making authority in all
matters, including without limitation, discussions with
claimants and their attorneys or other duly authorized
representatives. Fund Member further agrees to be fully
cooperative in supplying any information reasonably requested
by the Fund in the handling of claims. All decisions on
individual claims shall be made by the Fund or its designee,
including, without limitation, decisions concerning claim
values, payment due on the claim, settlement, subrogation,
litigation, or appeals.

10.

Excess Coverage/Reinsurance. The Fund, in its sole
discretion, may purchase excess coverage or reinsurance for
any or all Fund programs. In the event of a substantial change
in terms or cost of such coverage, the Fund reserves the right to
make adjustments to the terms and conditions of a CCS as
allowed by the Amendment by Notice process under this
Agreement. If any reinsurer, stop loss carrier, and/or excess
coverage provider fails to meet its obligations to the Fund or
any Fund Member, the Fund is not responsible for any payment
or any obligations to Fund Member from any reinsurer, stop
loss carrier, or excess coverage provider.

11.

Subrogation and Assignment of Rights. Fund Member, on its
own behalf and on behalf of any person entitled to benefits
under this Agreement, assigns all subrogation rights to the
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Fund. The Fund has the right, in its sole discretion, without
notice to Fund Member, to bring all claims and lawsuits in the
name of Fund Member or the Fund. Fund Member agrees that
all subrogation rights and recoveries belong first to the Fund,
up to the amount of benefits, expenses, and attorneys’ fees
incurred by the Fund, with the balance, if any, being paid to
Fund Member, unless otherwise specifically stated in the
Agreement. Award of funds to any person entitled to coverage,
whether by judgment or settlement, shall be conclusive proof
that the injured party has been made whole. Fund Member’s
right to be made whole is expressly superseded by the Fund’s
subrogation rights. If Fund Member procures alternate
coverage for a risk covered by the Fund, the latter acquired
coverage shall be deemed primary coverage concerning that
risk.
12.

No Waiver of Subrogation Rights. Fund Member shall do
nothing to prejudice or waive the Fund’s existing or
prospective subrogation rights under this Agreement. If Fund
Member has waived any subrogation right without first
obtaining the Fund’s written approval, the Fund shall be
entitled to recover from Fund Member any sums that it would
have been able to recover absent such waiver. Recoverable
amounts include attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.

13.

Appeals. Fund Member shall have the right to appeal any
written decision or recommendation to the Fund’s Board of
Trustees, and the Board’s determination will be final. Any
appeal shall be made in writing to the Board Chair within 30
days of the decision or recommendation.

14.

Bylaws, Policies, and Procedures. Fund Member agrees to
abide by the Bylaws of the Fund, as they may be amended from
time to time, and any and all written policies and procedures
established by the Fund (which are available from the Fund
upon written request). If a change is made to the Fund’s
Bylaws, written policies or procedures which conflicts with or
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impairs a CCS, such change will not apply to Fund Member
until the renewal of such CCS, unless Fund Member
specifically agrees otherwise.
15.

Payments. Fund Member represents and warrants that all
payments required under this Agreement of Fund Member shall
be made from its available current revenues.

16.

Cooperation and Access. Fund Member agrees to cooperate
and to comply in a timely manner with all reasonable requests
for information and/or records made by the Fund. Fund
Member further agrees to provide complete and accurate
statements of material facts, to not misrepresent or omit such
facts, engage in fraudulent conduct or make false statements to
the Fund. The Fund reserves the right to audit the relevant
records of Fund Member to determine compliance with this
Agreement.

17.

Fund Member’s Designation of Coordinator. Fund Member
agrees to designate a coordinator (Program Coordinator) for
Fund Member on this Agreement or any CCS executed by
Fund Member. Fund Member’s Program Coordinator shall
have express authority to represent and to bind Fund Member,
and the Fund will not be required to contact any other
individual regarding matters arising from or related to this
Agreement. Fund Member reserves the right to change its
Program Coordinator as needed, by giving written notice to the
Fund; such notice is not effective until actually received by the
Fund. Notice provided to the Chief Executive Officer of Fund
Member shall also serve as notice to the Program Coordinator.

18.

Security of Documents. Under this agreement the Fund may
grant Fund Member access to sensitive or protected
information. Fund Member agrees to assume the responsibility
for maintaining the security of this information and to take all
reasonable steps to avoid unauthorized disclosure of this
information.
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19.

Insurance Terminology. The Fund is not “insurance”, but is
instead a mechanism through which eligible governmental
entities join together to collectively self-insure and administer
certain risk exposures. Any reference in this Agreement to an
insurance term or concept is coincidental, is not intended to
characterize the Fund as “insurance” as defined by law, shall be
deemed to apply to self-insurance, and is not to be construed as
being contrary to the self-insurance concept.

20.

Representation. Fund Member authorizes the Fund to
represent Fund Member in any lawsuit, dispute, or proceeding
arising under or relating to any Fund program and/or coverage
in which Fund Member participates. The Fund may exercise
this right in its sole discretion and to the fullest extent
permitted or authorized by law. Fund Member shall fully
cooperate with the Fund, its designee, and the Fund’s chosen
counsel, including, without limitation, supplying any
information necessary or relevant to the lawsuit, dispute, or
proceeding in a timely fashion. Subject to specific revocation,
Fund Member designates the Fund to act as a class
representative on its behalf in matters arising out of this
Agreement.

21.

Members’ Equity. The Fund Board, in its sole discretion, may
declare a distribution of the Fund’s members’ equity to Fund
Members. Members’ equity belongs to the Fund. No individual
Fund Member is entitled to an individual allocation or portion
of members’ equity.

22.

Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the
Restated Interlocal Agreement, Bylaws and CCSs that are in
effect as to Fund Member from time to time, represent and
contain the complete understanding and agreement of the Fund
and Fund Member, and there are no representations,
agreements, arrangements, or undertakings, oral or written,
between the Fund and Fund Member other than those set forth
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in this Agreement duly executed in writing. In the event of
conflict between the terms of this Agreement and the Restated
Interlocal Agreement, Bylaws or any CCS, the specific terms
of the later adopted agreement shall prevail to the extent
necessary to resolve the conflict. This Agreement replaces all
previous Interlocal Participation Agreements between the Fund
and Fund Member. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this
Agreement does not supersede any unexpired participation
term or pending claim under an existing agreement between
Fund Member and Fund.
23.

Amendment by Notice. This Agreement, including any of its
component CCSs or coverage documents, may be amended by
the Fund, in writing, by providing Fund Member with written
notice before the earlier of (i) the effective date of the
amendment or (ii) the date by which Fund Member can
terminate without payment of late notice fees or liquidated
damages. Unless this Agreement expressly provides otherwise,
an amendment shall only apply prospectively and Fund
Member shall have the right to terminate this Agreement, or a
component CCS to which the amendment applies, before the
amendment becomes effective, as provided in this Agreement.
If Fund Member fails to give the Fund timely written notice of
termination, Fund Member shall be deemed to have consented
to the Fund’s amendment and agrees to abide by and be bound
by the amendment, without necessity of obtaining Fund
Member’s signature.
The Fund may amend this Agreement or any CCS effective upon
renewal. Amendments may be for any reason including changes
to the terms or contribution amount.
The Fund may also amend this Agreement or any CCS, effective
during the term of a CCS, for any reason including but not
limited to the following:
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a. State or federal governments, including any court, regulatory
body or agency thereof, adopt a statute, rule, decision, or take
any action that would substantially impact the rights or
financial obligations of the Fund as it pertains to this
Agreement, or any Fund program or CCS.
b. The terms of the Fund’s stop-loss or excess coverage or
reinsurance change substantially.
If the Fund exercises the option to amend the Agreement or any CCS
during the term of a CCS and prior to renewal, the Fund shall give
Fund Member 30 days advance written notice. Fund Member will
then have the right during the 30-day period to give the Fund written
notice of termination of the applicable Fund program, effective upon
the expiration of the 30-day notice period (or longer period if so
provided by the Fund in writing).
24.

Severability; Interpretation. If any portion of this Agreement
shall be declared illegal or held unenforceable for any reason,
the remaining portions shall continue in full force and effect.
Any questions of particular interpretation shall not be
interpreted against the drafter of this Agreement, but rather in
accordance with the fair meaning thereof.

25.

Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys’ Fees. This Agreement
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
of the State of Texas, without regard to the conflicts of law
principles of such state. Venue for the adjudication or
resolution of any dispute arising out of or relating to this
Agreement shall lie in Travis County, Texas, unless otherwise
mandated by law. In the event of a lawsuit or formal
adjudication between Fund Member and the Fund, the
prevailing party is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary
attorneys’ fees that are equitable and just.

26.

Waiver. No provision of this Agreement will be deemed
waived by either party unless expressly waived in writing by
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the waiving party. No waiver shall be implied by delay or any
other act or omission. No waiver by either party of any
provision of this Agreement shall be deemed a waiver of such
provision with respect to any subsequent matter relating to such
provision.
27.

Assignment. This Agreement or any duties or obligations
imposed by this Agreement shall not be assignable by Fund
Member without the prior written consent of the Fund.

28.

Authorization. By the execution of this Agreement, the
undersigned individuals warrant that they have been authorized
by all requisite governance action to enter into and to perform
the terms and conditions of this Agreement.

29.

Notice. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement,
any notice required or provided under this Agreement by either
party to the other party shall be in writing and shall be sent by
first class mail, postage prepaid or by a carrier for overnight
service or by electronic means typically used in commerce.
Notice to the Fund shall be sufficient if made or addressed as
follows: TASB Risk Management Fund, P.O. Box 301, Austin,
Texas 78767-0301, or tasbrmf@tasbrmf.org. Notice to a Fund
Member shall be sufficient if addressed to the Program
Coordinator or Fund Member’s Chief Executive Officer and
mailed to Fund Member’s physical or electronic address of
record on file with the Fund.

30.

Signatures/Counterparts. The failure of a party to provide an
original, manually executed signature to the other party shall
not affect the validity or enforceability of this Agreement.
Either party may rely upon a facsimile or imaged signature as if
it were an original. This Agreement may be executed in several
separate counterparts, each of which shall be an original and all
of which shall constitute one and the same instrument.
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WHEREFORE, the parties agree to be bound by this Agreement by
signing below.
For FUND MEMBER:
Fund Member Name:
By:
Signature of Fund Member’s Authorized Representative
Date:

Printed Name of Fund Member’s
Authorized Representative

For TASB Risk Management Fund Use Only
For TASB RISK MANAGEMENT FUND:
By:
Chair, TASB Risk Management Fund Board of Trustees
Date:

